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Introduction 
 
When the ruling Alliance-coalition of Malaysia suffered a painful defeat in the 1969 general 
elections this led supporters of two opposition parties to organize celebration marches on the 
streets of Malaysia’s capital city, Kuala Lumpur. In response, the country’s largest party, the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), rallied its supporters to hit the streets as well. 
Initially, celebrations elapsed peacefully, but when rumours spread that a number of Malays 
were attacked by Chinese and Indian Malaysians while wanting to join the main group of 
UMNO-supporters ethnic riots erupted. As a consequence of these riots, lasting from 13 May 
until 15 May,
1
 approximately 600 Malaysians, the majority of whom were of Chinese origin, 
lost their life.
2
 
 The 13 May Incident proved a watershed moment in the history of Malaysia, since it 
convinced the country’s political leaders that more should be done for Malays in order to 
prevent similar events from occurring in the future.
3
 For this reason, the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) was adopted in 1971. The aims of the NEP were twofold: reducing and 
eventually eradicating poverty ‘by raising income levels and increasing employment 
opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race’4 whilst ‘accelerating the process of 
restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function.’5  
In theory, bumiputras, i.e. Malay Malaysians and other indigenous Malaysians, were 
to be the beneficiaries of restructuring, but in practice the latter group was largely ignored. 
Four different mechanisms were deployed for the redistribution of wealth to Malays. First, 
public enterprises bought shares from, in most cases, foreign-owned companies operating in 
the country. Subsequently, these shares were either sold on to individual investors or held in a 
trust fund on behalf of the Malay community. Second, the Industrial Coordination Act, 
enacted in 1975, required that 30% of equity in manufacturing companies were held by 
members of this community in 1990, the final year of the NEP. This did not apply to 
companies exporting more than a fifth of their production.
6
 Third, Malay entrepreneurs could 
                                                          
1
 V. Matheson Hooker, A short history of Malaysia: linking east and west (Crows Nest, New South Wales 2003) 
230-231. 
2
 Time, 23 May 1969. ‘World: Race war in Malaysia’. 
3
 C. M. Turnbull, A history of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei (Revised Edition; Sydney etc. 1989) 268. 
4
 Economic Planning Unit, Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (Kuala Lumpur 1970) 1. 
5
 Idem. 
6
 E. T. Gomez and Jomo K. S., Malaysia’s political economy: politics, patronage and profits (Cambridge etc. 
1997) 29-32 and 40-43. 
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obtain business premises and loans under favourable conditions. Fourth, a quota system was 
set up for the issuing of licenses and government procurement.
7
 As a consequence, Malay 
ownership in the plantation and tin mining industry constituted 45% and 50%, respectively, 
during the mid-1980s; in 1990 Malays owned 19.3% of total equity capital in Malaysia.
8
 
This master’s thesis seeks to analyse whether the favourable competitive position that 
accrued to Malay Malaysian entrepreneurs under the NEP was historically unique. It 
addresses the following research question: to what extent did changes in the conditions for the 
development of entrepreneurship of varying ethnic origin during the period 1920-1970 
anticipate the New Economic Policy?  A differentiation is made between the four main ethnic 
groups: the Malay Malaysians, other indigenous Malaysians (primarily Dayaks in East 
Malaysia), Chinese Malaysians and Indian Malaysians. The term ‘Malaysian’ refers here to 
the citizenship granted to these groups since independence, not to ethnic origin. 
The definition of ‘Malay’ is the one given in article 160 of the Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia, namely ‘a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay 
language, conforms to Malay custom and was before Merdeka Day born in the Federation or 
in Singapore or born of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or in Singapore, or is 
on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or is the issue of such a person’.9 
Consequently, a person belonging to any of the ethnic groups in Malaysia, including the 
Chinese and Indian groups, may qualify for this status, but they rarely do so in practice. 
Malaysia has made a significant transformation between 1920 and 1970, both in 
economic and political terms. Regarding the latter, the geographical area now covering 
Malaysia, did not become a single constitutional entity until the establishment of the 
Federation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963. Anno 1920, it was divided into the Straits 
Settlements (SS) and nine British sultanates (four Federated Malay States (FMS) and five 
Unfederated Malay States (UMS)) on the peninsula, and two British protectorates on Borneo, 
Sarawak and British North Borneo (BNB). Not long after World War II, the SS, excluding 
Singapore and Labuan, FMS and UMS were merged into the Federation of Malaya which 
gained independence in 1957.
10
 Meanwhile, the territories on Borneo were brought under 
direct British control when Sarawak and BNB became Crown Colonies in 1946. Both these 
                                                          
7
 S. Ratuva, Politics of preferential treatment: trans-global study of affirmative action and ethnic conflict in Fiji, 
Malaysia and South Africa (Canberra 2013) 208. 
8
 Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia’s political economy, 39 and 168. 
9
 Federal Constitution (15
th
 Reprint; Putrajaya 2010) 153; the text of article 160 has remained unchanged from 
the 1957 Federal Constitution. 
10
 Matheson Hooker, Short history of Malaysia, 133-137 and 207.  
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areas remained under British control until 1963 when they first were granted independence, 
and subsequently were unified with the Federation of Malaya.
11
 
 
12
 
  Source: Based on Maddison Project database. 
 
Table 1: Average annual growth, selected periods (constant prices)
13
 
 Maddison Project 
(GDP per capita) 
Nazrin  
(PFCE per capita) 
WDI  
(GDP per capita) 
1920-1939 2.1% 2.7%  
1948-1957 3.6%   
1961-1970 3.1%  3.5% 
Source: See note 13. 
 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Malaysia almost doubled in the fifty-
year period under review here from $1,110 in 1920 to $2,079 in 1970 in constant prices 
(figure 1). In 1970 GDP per capita was the third highest in Southeast Asia, only exceeded by 
Singapore and Brunei.
14
 The average annual growth rate was highest in 1948-1957, followed 
by 1961-70 and 1920-1939. Unfortunately, the Maddison Project database is the only source 
giving GDP per capita data for the period preceding independence, but Nazrin does calculate 
                                                          
11
 Turnbull, History of Malaysia, 254-257. 
12
 GDP per capita is denoted in the 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollar (1990 Int. GK$), a hypothetical unit 
of currency that has the same Purchasing Power Parity as the U. S. Dollar had in the United States in 1990. 
13
 Based on Maddison Project database; Raja Nazrin, ‘Methodology for deriving the domestic private final 
consumption expenditure series for Malaya, 1900-1939’ (working paper presented at XIV International 
Economic History Congress, Helsinki 2006, session 103) 33; World Bank, World Databank: World 
Development Indicators. <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx> 21-04-2015. 
14
 Maddison Project database (2013). 
<http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data.htm> 21-04-2015. 
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Figure 1: GDP per capita (constant prices), 1920-1970 
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the Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE) for the pre-War period. The growth of 
PFCE per capita was 0.6% higher than that of GDP per capita, thus indicating a slower than 
average growth in either investment, government spending or net exports (table 1).  
 Four theoretical factors may be said to determine the conditions for the development 
of entrepreneurship in different ethnic groups. First, as Acemoglu and Robinson argue, 
government policies play a role by shaping the economic institutions of a country, and thus 
determining whether there exists a level playing field for entrepreneurs of all ethnic groups, or 
a tilted playing field that favours a certain ethnic group.
15
 Second, the initial competitive 
position of an ethnic group is important, since it is easier for those already in possession of 
capital and experience in business to strengthen their position than for those without this 
capital or experience. This is particularly relevant in Malaysia given the circumstances under 
which the country gained independence. By contrast to its neighbour Indonesia, 
decolonization was associated with negotiations rather than warfare, and therefore signalled a 
less radical break from the past.
16
 Third, and connected to this, the strength of a groups’ 
business network is similarly of potential importance in providing access to capital and 
markets. While the preceding three factors are of an institutional nature, a fourth factor is 
purely economic, referring to the features of the Malaysian economy. Economic growth was 
accompanied by a gradual change in the structure of the economy. Initially this was heavily 
geared towards the export of primary resources, primarily rubber and tin, but as time went by 
manufacturing won in importance.
17
  In 1970 the manufacturing sector accounted for 13.1% 
of GDP and 11.4% of total employment in Malaysia, up from 5.7% and 6.7% in 1947.
18
 With 
the changing structure of the economy, new opportunities arose for entrepreneurs to become 
active in sectors previously unknown to the country.  
For the purpose of answering the research question the thesis is divided into three 
sections, each covering a specific historical period. All sections begin with an overview of the 
period under review, offering an outline of the structure of government, the size of the 
population and its ethnic composition and the economy. This is followed by four subsections, 
one for each ethnic group. The first section focuses on the interwar years, starting in 1920 
when the world economy resumed peacetime production after the ending of the First World 
                                                          
15
 D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson, Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty (New York 
2012) 429-430. 
16
 J. van de Kerkhof, ‘’Colonial’ enterprise and the indigenization of management in independent Indonesia and 
Malaysia’ in: J. T. Lindblad and P. Post eds., Indonesian economic decolonization in regional and international 
perspective (Leiden 2009) 175-196, there 175-176. 
17
 Jomo K. S., ‘Preface’ in: Jomo  K. S. ed., Malaysian industrial policy (Singapore 2007) xiii-xxv, there xv-xvi. 
18
 Jomo K. S., ‘Industrialization and industrial policy in Malaysia’ in: Jomo ed., Industrial policy, 1-34, there 2. 
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War, and ends on 15 February 1942 with the surrender of the Allied forces following the 
Battle of Singapore. It covers the last years of, what may be called, the traditional period of 
British colonialism in Malaya and Borneo, since plans for more autonomy and, ultimately, 
independence were still in the making. This changed in the years between the end of the 
Pacific War in August 1945 and the independence of the Federation of Malaya on 31 August 
1957. Colonial policies were less paternalistic than in the pre-War period.
19
 While the first 
two sections cover entrepreneurship under colonialism, the early independence period running 
from September 1957 until 1970, forms the main thrust of section three.  
The Japanese occupation without doubt had an effect on the process of 
decolonization,
20
 but this period is nonetheless excluded from our analysis for both historical 
and practical reasons.  Although the Chinese and Indian Malaysians gained more political 
power as independence approached, the traditional Malay elite remained the British’ closest 
partner in governing the colony throughout the colonial period. Ultimately, it was their 
influence that sealed Malaysia’s fate as a country with a federal rather than a unitary 
governmental structure. From April 1946 to February 1948 the peninsula was united in a new 
colony called the Malayan Union. The Malay elite, however, feared to lose their privileged 
position and managed to convince the British Colonial Office to restore the federal power 
structure.
21
 As to entrepreneurship, the surrender of the Japanese mainly worked to the benefit 
of British business interests. Under the provisions of the 1939 Trading with the Enemy Act, 
Japanese property in British territories was placed under the auspices of a Custodian of 
Enemy Property, before being taken over by an Administrator of Japanese Property in 1952, 
who was in charge of selling the seized property.
22
 In the case of BNB, the Colonial 
Development Corporation and agency house Harrisons & Crosfield were the main 
beneficiaries.
23
  The virtual absence of primary source material is an additional reason for 
excluding the Japanese occupation from the analysis. 
The conclusion offers an answer to the research question. In doing so, attention will be 
paid to policies pursued by the government as well as the results of such policies. The analysis 
is sensitive to both qualitative and quantitative aspects of entrepreneurship. It may, for 
example, be the case that the Malay Malaysians had a significantly larger stake in the 
                                                          
19
 T. N. Harper, The end of empire and the making of Malaya (Cambridge etc. 1999) 59. 
20
 Harper, Making of Malaya, 59-60. 
21
 Matheson Hooker, Short history of Malaysia, 186-188. 
22
 Foreign & Commonwealth Office historians, History note no. 13: British policy towards enemy property 
during and after the Second World War (no place 1998) 7 and 101. 
23
 S. Osman, ‘Japanese economic activities in Sabah from the 1890s until 1941’, Journal of  
Southeast Asian Studies 29: 1 (1998) 24-43, there 42. 
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economy in 1970 than in 1920, but still predominantly owned companies in lower value-
added sectors.  
The research is based on primary sources and secondary literature on the economic 
and political history of Malaysia. The main primary sources used are annual reports for the 
SS, FMS, the Unfederated Malay States of Kedah and Perlis, the Federation of Malaya and 
the crown colonies of Sarawak and BNB published by the Colonial Office, the governmental 
newspapers Sarawak Gazette and British North Borneo Herald, the laws of the SS, BNB and 
Federation of Malaysia, and year books published by the Federal Department of Information 
of the Malaysian government. 
  Analysing the changing role of entrepreneurs of different ethnic origin in the fifty-year 
period preceding the NEP is relevant for a number of reasons. Most importantly, it fills a gap 
in the literature on the economic history of Malaysia. Currently, only the works of Drabble
24
 
and Tajuddin
25
 discuss the entire Federation of Malaysia during the period under review here, 
whereas other works focus on the developments in a certain region during a limited set of 
years.
26
 Moreover, entrepreneurship is only of secondary importance in these works. This is 
not the case in a number of business histories, but they are preoccupied with either British
27
 or 
Chinese
28
 business in Malaysia. Business histories on other ethnic groups, let alone all of 
them simultaneously, are virtually absent. In addition, the subject is relevant as it sheds light 
on the background of the NEP, while also highlighting the effect of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) on domestic entrepreneurship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 J. H. Drabble, An economic history of Malaysia, c. 1800-1990: the transition to modern  
economic growth (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York 2000). 
25
 A. Tajuddin, Malaysia in the world economy (1824-2011): capitalism, ethnic divisions, and  
“managed” democracy  (Plymouth 2012). 
26
 See for example: K. G. Ooi, Of free trade and native interests: the Brookes and the economic development of  
Sarawak, 1841-1941 (Oxford etc. 1997). 
27
 See for example: N. J. White, British business in post-colonial Malaysia, 1957-1970: ‘neo- 
colonialism’ or ‘disengagement’? (London and New York 2004). 
28
 See for example: E. T. Gomez, Chinese business in Malaysia: accumulation, accommodation and ascendance  
(Richmond, Surrey 1999).  
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1. 1920-1941: rubber, rice, and indigenous rights 
 
As was mentioned above, Malaysia was far from a single constitutional unit in 1920. During 
the period under review in this section, it was divided into one British colony (SS) and nine 
sultanates (four FMS and five UMS) on the peninsula, and two additional protectorates on the 
island of Borneo, namely Sarawak and BNB. The SS, consisting of Penang, Malacca and 
Singapore
29
 along the Strait of Malacca and the island Labuan off the coast of Borneo, were 
administered by a Governor directly answerable to the Colonial Office in London. He was 
aided in his task by two councils; the Executive Council, which wholly consisted of official 
members, and the Legislative Council containing both official and nominated members, with 
the former having a slight majority.
30
 Originally, the group of nominated members was 
comprised of five Europeans, three Chinese, one Indian, a Malay and an Eurasian, all of 
whom were appointed by the governor. In 1924 two additional Europeans were added, elected 
by the British members of the Penang Chamber of Commerce and the Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce, respectively.
31
 
The Governor of the SS simultaneously functioned as the High Commissioner of the 
FMS, consisting of four sultanates: Pahang, Perak, Negeri Sembilan and Selangor. In this 
function he presided over a Federal Council, which consisted of a British Resident-General, 
the four sultans of the respective states, and a number of Chinese and European 
businessmen.
32
 The Federal Council was in charge of making laws on the federal level, 
whereas the making of law on the state level was delegated to State Councils headed by the 
sultan; the British resident, members of the royal family, leading Malay chiefs and 
representatives of the Chinese community were the additional members.
33
 Similar State 
Councils were set up in the five Unfederated Malay States of Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and 
Terengganu in the north of the peninsula, and Johor in the south. In the UMS, however, there 
were no common political institutions or Residents. Instead, the United Kingdom was 
represented by advisors with less authority. According to Matheson Hooker, the UMS 
                                                          
29
 In principle, Singapore is excluded from the analysis made here, because it was not part of Malaysia for the 
whole period covered in this thesis; it was expelled from the Federation in 1965. Hence the Straits Settlements 
refer to Penang, Malacca and Labuan. References to the city-state will, however, be made occasionally given its 
importance in local business networks.  
30
 I. Sugimoto, Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical 
investigations (New Jersey etc. 2011) 6. 
31
 L. A. Mills, British rule in Eastern Asia: a study of contemporary government and economic development in 
British Malay and Hong Kong (London etc. 1942) 29. 
32
 Tajuddin, Malaysia in the world economy, 38. 
33
 W. G. Maxwell, Report for 1921 on the Federated Malay States (London 1922) 3. 
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‘enjoyed the best of both worlds’ with sultans retaining a considerable share of autonomy in 
domestic affairs, while using British advice to innovate their administration.
34
 
Indigenous inhabitants also played a role in the administration of Sarawak, albeit less 
prominently. From 1917 until the Japanese occupation the Kingdom was ruled by Charles 
Vyner Brooke, the third and last White Rajah, who possessed absolute power, but 
nevertheless regularly consulted a Supreme Council consisting of senior officials and Malay 
leaders. The General Council bringing together the leaders from all indigenous communities, 
in contrast, only met once every three years, while the role of the British government was 
limited to maintaining foreign relations.
35
 This was the same in BNB with the administration 
being entrusted to a London-based private corporation, the British North Borneo Chartered 
Company (BNBCC).
36
 The Company was represented in Borneo by a Governor, who was 
advised by a Legislative Council comprising nine official members and five members not 
affiliated to the bureaucracy: two representatives of the planters, two of the Chinese 
community, and one of the European community.
37
 
 The size of the population inhabiting these territories was 3,618,000 in 1921, 
increasing to 4,130,000 ten years later and 5,786,000 in 1947. In 1931, the large majority of 
the people (83.5%) lived in Malaya, with 10.4% living in Sarawak and a further 6.1% in 
British North Borneo.
38
 Malay Malaysians were the largest group in the SS, FMS, and UMS. 
In the latter they even formed a clear majority with 76.6% of the population being part of this 
group (Table 2). Even though the statistics for BNB put Malays and other indigenous 
Malaysians in the same category, it can be safely assumed that this category mainly 
encompassed other indigenes. The Kadazans or Dusuns constituted the largest ethnic group, 
while there were also significant amounts of Bajaus, Muruts and Kedayans living in the 
protectorate.
39
 In Sarawak Sea Dayaks or Ibans formed 62.3% of the ‘other indigenous 
Malaysians’ and the Land Dayaks and Melanaus 13.7% each.40 
 
 
                                                          
34
 Matheson Hooker, Short history of Malaysia, 137. 
35
 Ooi, Of free trade and native interests, 2. 
36
 Matheson Hooker, Short history of Malaysia, 134-135. 
37
 British North Borneo (Chartered) Company, Handbook of the State of North Borneo (Torquay 1929) 75-76. 
38
 Drabble, Economic history of Malaysia, 90. 
39
 A. Kaur, Economic change in East Malaysia: Sabah and Sarawak since 1850 (Basingstoke, Hampshire and 
New York 1998) 17. 
40
 Ooi, Of free trade and native interests, 10. 
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Table 2: Population of Malaysia by ethnic group, c. 193041 
 Straits 
Settlements 
(1934) 
Federated 
Malay 
States 
(1921) 
Unfederated 
Malay States 
(1921) 
British 
North 
Borneo 
(1921) 
Sarawak 
(1939) 
Malaysia 
(estimate) 
Chinese 226,487   
(42.6 %) 
494,548 
(37.3%) 
180,259 
(16.0%) 
39,156 
(14.9 %) 
123,626 
(25.2%) 
1,064,076 
(28.5%) 
Eurasians 4,546 (0.9%) 3,204 
(0.2%) 
302 (0.0%) … … 8052 
(0.2%) 
Europeans 1,977 (0.4%) 5,686 
(0.4%) 
1,084 (0.1%) … 704 
(0.1%) 
9451 
(0.3%) 
Indians 67,639 
(12.7%) 
305,219 
(23.0%) 
61,781 
(5.5%) 
… … 434,639 
(11.6%) 
Malays 228,017 
(42.9%) 
510,821 
(38.6%) 
860,934 
(76.6%) 
… 92,709 
(18.9%) 
1,692,481 
(45.3%) 
Malays and 
other 
indigenous 
Malaysians 
… … … 203,041 
(77.2%) 
… 203,041 
(5.4%) 
Other 
indigenous 
Malaysians 
… … …  268,967 
(54.8%) 
268,967 
(7.2%) 
Others 3,214 (0.6%) 5,412 
(0.4%) 
19,584 
(1.7%) 
20,955 
(8.0%) 
4,579 
(0.9%) 
53,744 
(1.4%) 
Total 531,880 
(100%) 
1,324,890 
(100%) 
1,123,944 
(100%) 
263,152 
(100%) 
490,585 
(100%) 
3,734,451 
(100%) 
Source: See note 41. 
 
The economy was geared towards the production and export of primary commodities, 
primarily rubber and tin, for the Chinese, Japanese and Western markets.
42
 Tin was confined 
to peninsular Malaysia
43
 which also produced most rubber, accounting for 96 per cent of 
rubber exports in 1929. Sago, timber
 44
 and a wide range of jungle products, including edible 
bird nests were mainly exported from the Borneo territories.
45
 As for imports, these were 
dominated by food crops and manufactured products with the latter category growing in 
importance towards the end of the period under review.
46
 The composition of trade resulted in 
the annual growth of PFCE per capita in Malaya showing high volatility (Figure 2). 
                                                          
41
 Derived from Straits Settlements: A. Caldecott, Annual report on the social and economic progress of the 
people of the Straits Settlements, 1934 (London 1935) 6; Federated Malay States and Unfederated Malay States: 
J. E. Nathan, The census of British Malaya (the Straits Settlements, Federated Malay States and protected states 
of Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and Brunei) 1921 (London, Dunstable and Watford 1922) 29; 
British North Borneo: Y. L. Lee, ‘The population of British Borneo’, Population Studies 15: 3 (1962) 226-243, 
there 230; Sarawak: Ooi, Of free trade and native interests, 10. 
42
 Drabble, Economic history of Malaysia, 121. 
43
 Ooi, Of free trade and native interests, 335. 
44
 Drabble, Economic history of Malaysia, 129 and 132-133. 
45
 M. C. Cleary, ‘Indigenous trade and European economic intervention in North-West Borneo  
c.1860-1930’, Modern Asian Studies 30: 2 (1996) 301-324, there 320-321. 
46
 Drabble, Economic history of Malaysia, 126. 
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   Source: Based on Nazrin, Domestic private final consumption expenditure Malaya, 33. 
 
 
   Source: Derived from Nathan, Census of British Malaya, 236-247. 
 
Given Malaysia’s function as a producer of cash crops and minerals, it is not 
surprising that the primary sector, comprising agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining, 
employed the largest number of people in Malaya in 1921. The dominance of the primary 
sector was most pronounced in the UMS where it employed 82.1% of the working population; 
the tertiary sector employed 12.5% and the secondary sector 5.4%. Corresponding figures 
were respectively 73.7%, 20.7% and 5.6% for the FMS, and 56.3%, 32.7% and 11.0% for the 
SS excluding Labuan (Figure 3). 
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Malay Malaysians 
All other things being equal, one would expect Malay Malaysians to fulfil a controlling role in 
all economic branches on the peninsula, given their numerical dominance. The Malays were 
fairly well represented in the government councils of the FMS, UMS and Sarawak, especially 
when compared with the representation of Indian Malaysians and other indigenes. The 
effectiveness of this representation for the promotion of business interests is, nonetheless, 
doubtable, since the politically active Malays were aristocrats rather than entrepreneurs. The 
Chinese, in contrast, were represented by businessmen.
47
 
 As a consequence, colonial policies regulating Malay Malaysian entrepreneurship 
were somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the Malays could count on a privileged status. 
As part of the Malay Reservations Enactment of 1913, which came into force a year later, a 
considerable portion of land in the FMS was set aside for the Malay population.
48
  Judging 
from annual reports, Malay reservations were not limited to the FMS; the 1938 annual report 
of the Straits Settlements mentions there being one in Tasek Gelugor, Penang.
49
 In Kedah a 
Malay Reservations Enactment, which also applied to Siamese permanently inhabiting the 
state, was passed in 1931,
50
 in Kelantan in 1930, in Perlis in 1935, in Johor in 1939 and in 
Terengganu in 1941.
51
 By the latter year the area set aside as reservation in Malaya covered 
3.5 million acres
52
.
53
 At the other hand, Malays could not use this land as they saw fit; the 
various laws prohibited the sale of land to non-Malays, as well as growing rubber on land 
suitable for wet-rice cultivation.
54
 These clauses were not always appreciated as a 1920 
annual report for the FMS tells us that Malays often preferred to take up land outside 
reservations, because this was readily saleable to people of other nationalities after being 
brought under cultivation.
55
 
In a similar vein, ’any Malay domiciled in the Settlement Malacca’56 could apply for  a 
piece of Crown land of under ten acres to become his customary land under the Malacca 
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Lands Customary Rights Ordinance. A customary landholder in principle possessed ‘a 
permanent heritable and transferable right of use and occupancy over his land’,57 but could be 
disowned if he failed to fulfil a number of clauses for three consecutive years. Among these 
was the duty to plant paddy and conform to the directions of the Resident Councillor 
regulating or prohibiting the growing of crops that could exhaust the soil.  In addition, all 
minerals and buried treasures remained the property of the Crown, with the landholder only 
receiving compensation in case of damage.
58
 
According to Tajuddin these policies sorted two effects. First, with rural Malay 
Malaysians living in reservations more land became available for European and Chinese 
plantations. Second, it largely confined the indigenous group to subsistence agriculture, 
growing rice on small plots for own consumption. The Malay elite was said to be actively 
collaborating with the British in pursuing these policies, rather than opposing them, since the 
creation of greater economic opportunities for the masses could threat their traditional power 
position.
59
 Given the contrasting interests of the elite and entrepreneurs, then, one can safely 
say that Malay political representation was not particularly effective in promoting business 
interests. 
That being said, Tajuddin’s judgement is unbalanced. If the system of Malay 
reservations was aimed at making more land available to non-Malays, it would have been 
logical to prohibit ownership of land by Malay Malaysians outside these reserves, but there is 
no evidence for this to be found in the primary sources. Furthermore, even if rice was grown 
on small holdings with an average size of 2.5 acres, this did not necessarily limit peasants to 
subsistence agriculture; the average yield on such holdings was sufficient to feed a family of 
six persons and leave a small surplus available for sale. Moreover, rice was grown as a 
commercial crop in some regions on holdings two to three times this size.
60
  In the exports of 
the Unfederated Malay State of Perlis, paddy and rice ranked above rubber; between 20 June, 
1928 and 8 June, 1929, 108,008 piculs
61
 of the former were exported as against 4,257 piculs 
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of rubber.
62
 Due to droughts, exports of rice and paddy were smaller in the following years, 
but continued to be well above those of rubber.
63
  
Investments in irrigation schemes and experiments with heavy yielding varieties of 
paddy seed, which were to be distributed among smallholders, similarly do not fit the bill of a 
colonial government doing everything in its power to keep the bulk of the population on the 
subsistence level. Among these irrigation schemes were a 2,000-acre scheme in Duyong, 
Malacca, schemes covering 2,150 acres in Sungei Pinong, Sungei Berong and Pulau Butong, 
Penang, 
64
 and the construction of a ferro-concrete dam across the Pelarit River in Perlis.
65
 In 
the SS, irrigation works were not entirely paid for by the government; contributions by the 
proprietors were expected.
66
 The distribution of paddy seed among smallholders was similarly 
subject to the condition that the authorities received an equal amount of paddy from the 
peasants in return.
67
 These conditions may have been part of the reason why both the area 
planted with paddy and the yield per acre only showed small increases during the 1930s.
68
 
Similar efforts to raise production were absent in the Borneo territories. 
With no limits on the ownership of land outside reservations and the opportunity to 
unlawfully grow rubber on reservation-land,
69
 rural Malays also ventured into the cultivation 
of other crops. According to Drabble, they gained a substantial share of Malaya’s rubber 
industry growing the cash crop on smallholdings.
70
 By contrast, very few Malays owned 
rubber estates; at the end of 1938, estates of over a hundred acres covered a total of 206,858 
acres in the Straits Settlements, including Singapore
71
, of these 74,693 acres were under Asian 
ownership, but the Malays only owned 1,646 acres.
72
 Other crops grown by Malay 
smallholders included coconuts, pineapples and a wide variety of other fruits
73
 as well as 
coffee
74
, sago
75
, and to a lesser extent tobacco, which was mainly produced by Chinese 
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Malaysians.
76
 The quality of these products varied considerably; copra produced by coconut 
smallholders in the Straits Settlements using their own kilns was said to obtain a ‘premium’ 
on the market,
77
 but the quality of coconuts grown by Malays in Kuching was clearly inferior 
to those grown by their Chinese counterparts.
78
 This is explained by the fact that intercropping 
and growing different crops on various parts of their holdings was a common practice 
amongst Malay smallholders. As a consequence, they tended to concentrate on production of 
one crop depending on the prevailing market price, causing them to neglect other crops.
79
 
Additionally, poultry and eggs were supplied to the local market.
80
 
Malay Malaysian entrepreneurial activities were not limited to the agricultural sector. 
In both 1927, 1929, 1934 and 1938, the years for which data is available, they constituted the 
largest single group of fishermen in the SS, including Singapore, and the FMS. The colonial 
administration sought to strengthen the Malays’ position by educating Malay students, mainly 
sons of fishermen, on various fishing techniques, and the processing and sale of fish.
81
 A 
similar role in the fishing industry was fulfilled by the Malay Malaysians in Sarawak.
82
  
The position of Malay entrepreneurs in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the 
economy was considerably weaker. Regarding the former, neither the primary sources nor the 
secondary literature makes any mention of Malays owning manufacturing facilities. The 
situation was less extreme in the tertiary sector, but they were certainly not the most dominant 
group in trade and commerce. According to Ooi, the government of Sarawak obstructed the 
development of a Malay mercantile class, because it considered commerce to be an unsuitable 
activity for this group.
83
 In practice, however, Malays were allowed to open shophouses
84
 and 
even were the only ones, apart from Kedayans, authorized to trade in Kayal villages.
85
 
Nor did they play any significant role in the moneylending industry, although Firth 
does argue that Malay moneylenders were the main source of capital in the fishing industry of 
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Kelantan. Two factors are at the root of the generally weak position in finance. First, Islamic 
law prohibits the bearing of interest on loans to fellow Muslims, thus strongly limiting the 
possibility to earn money. In practice, however, Malays were able to circumvent these rules 
by disguising interest as a form of profit-sharing. Second, in general, Malays lacked the 
capital to fulfil such a role in the first place. According to Firth, fishermen had an average net 
income per capita per month of eleven Straits dollars in the early 1940s which was below the 
average wage of $12 to $15 for a Malay estate labourer.
86
 Rather than being able to lend 
money, then, Malay entrepreneurs were dependent upon moneylenders charging exorbitantly 
high interest rates; the Sarawak Gazette refers to one charging an annual interest rate of 
48%.
87
 In Malaya, the government-promoted cooperatives were to offer an alternative source 
of capital, but proved largely unsuccessful in doing so. 
88
 
 
Other indigenous Malaysians 
If one would expect Malay Malaysian entrepreneurs to be dominant in Malaya based on the 
size of their ethnic group, the same should apply to the other indigenous Malaysians in BNB 
and Sarawak. The other indigenes, however, lacked both the unity and the political 
representation Malays could benefit from. Nevertheless, they could count on a similar 
privileged position in Bornean land policies, as the Malays could in Malaya.
89
 As of 1920, 
agricultural land in Sarawak was divided into three categories: town and suburban lands, 
country lands, and native holdings. Native holdings could only be utilised by indigenous 
Malaysians for the production of fruit and paddy. In addition, native land reserves were 
created and divided into holdings of three acres to be distributed among indigenes. This 
categorization of land was declared obsolete in 1933, when the new Land Rules made a 
distinction between mixed zones, in which land could be owned by all ethnic groups, and 
native areas.
90
  
Policies of the Brooke administration were not limited to promoting the production of 
foodstuffs; the 1 April issue of the Sarawak Gazette tells us about ‘new Land Regulations 
allowing natives of the country to own three acres of land free of charge for the cultivation of 
rubber, sago, coconuts, or similar produce, in addition to land used for the cultivation of rice 
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and vegetables.’91 It is very well possible that these three-acre holdings concerned land that 
was less well suitable for the cultivation of food crops, as government sought to restrict the 
growing of rubber on land that could be utilized for the production of paddy, sago, pepper or 
coconuts.
92
  
 In BNB the division between various types of agricultural land was less rigid. In 
principle, all land in the State was owned by the Chartered Company, and could therefore be 
allocated to foreign investors, which were to play a central role in its economic development. 
That being said, land could not be alienated for this purpose if it had already been brought 
into use by indigenous Malaysians.
93
 The 1930 Land Ordinance stipulated that indigenes 
possessed native customary rights enabling them to obtain holdings with a maximum size of 
fifteen acres. These native rights applied to four types of land: land held on customary tenure, 
land planted with a minimum of twenty fruit trees per acre, grazing land and burial grounds or 
land with other spiritual importance. In addition, they applied to isolated plants of economic 
value, for example durian trees or sago plants.
94
 
 As was the case in Malaya and Sarawak, privileges were not without constraints on 
entrepreneurship. Customary tenure conferred ‘a permanent heritable and transferable right of 
use and occupancy’95 to the tenant, but the land could only be used for the commercial 
cultivation of wet rice, whereas other crops could solely be cultivated ‘on the homestead 
principle’.96 In a similar vein, indigenes were free to access State land to collect timber and 
jungle products, but not to sell these products. Possibilities to speculate with native land were 
limited, due to the prohibition of dealings in land between indigenes and ‘aliens’.97 An 
additional advantage was the exemption from paying the so-called road rate, an annual tax 
levied on owners of land that lay in the vicinity of a road.
98
 Since laws of BNB and Sarawak 
did not differentiate between Malays and other indigenous Malaysians, above mentioned land 
policies also applied to the former. They are nonetheless included in this section, because 
other indigenes were the main beneficiaries.
99
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Given these policies, it is not surprising to find that the majority of indigenous Malaysian 
entrepreneurs were active in the agricultural sector with some ethnic groups specializing in 
the cultivation of certain crops. In Sarawak, sago was mainly cultivated by the Melanau, an 
ethnic group of which most members practise Islam. Traditionally, the industry was 
characterized by patron-client relationships as ordinary Melanaus procured palms from 
members of the Melanau nobility who owned sago plantations. The profits were equally 
divided between owners of the plantation, men who fell the palms and extract the pith from it, 
and women who were responsible for producing the starch.
100
 The concentration of sago 
plantations seems only to have grown during the period under review with people more than 
willing to sell their ancestral plantations to nobles.
101
 This development has undoubtedly 
widened the income gap amongst Melanaus, but not to the extent that it created a small group 
of haves and a large group of have-nots; the continued high price for sago ensured a decent 
income for all entrepreneurs active in this sector. According to a monthly report from 1920 
money had ‘never been so plentiful amongst the Melanaus’, while a 1926 report argues that 
the sago trade in Matu was poor due to ‘Milanos being so well off’.102   
  Fishing was a second entrepreneurial activity commonly practised among Melanaus, 
who, together with Malays, constituted the largest group of fishermen in Sarawak.
103
 In BNB 
this position was reserved for the Bajau, an Islamic group.
104
 To a lesser extent, Melanau 
entrepreneurs tapped jelutong trees to extract latex,
105
 but the collection of jungle produce was 
mainly carried out by various Dayak tribes,
106
 who also acted as primary traders selling the 
products to tradesmen located at strategic positions in the interior. As locating and collecting 
these products demanded a particular set of ecological skills and a distinctive social 
organization, the Dayaks played a strategic role in the industry.
107
 
 The entrepreneurial activities of the predominantly non-Islamic Dayak people were 
not limited to this industry, however. According to Kaur, Dayaks, most notably Ibans, 
controlled more than half of Sarawak rubber smallholdings in 1935.
108
 With the virtual 
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absence of plantations this gave them a significant stake in the industry.
109
 Even though the 
Brooke administration, in principle, only encouraged ‘the natives to plant up as much rubber 
as each family could personally look after’,110 it was not uncommon for Dayaks to employ 
coolies.
111
 As the rubber industry was characterized by booms and busts
112
 and the quality of 
rubber produced strongly differed from smallholder to smallholder, it is not easy to make any 
secure statements on the financial success of these ventures, but a report from 1920 argues 
that Dayaks could earn as much as fifteen Sarawak dollars
113
 a day from their rubber 
holdings.
114
 By contrast, a Malay Malaysian estate labourer in Malaya had to work an entire 
month for a similar wage.
115
 
 Three additional activities set this group apart from other indigenes. First, while other 
groups cultivated paddy as a food crop, Dayaks also used it to trade with Chinese in exchange 
for other products or cash.
116
 This mainly concerned hill paddy obtained by shifting 
cultivation; a practice discouraged by government in Sarawak because it was said to be 
exhausting the soil, but not prohibited.
117
 In BNB, by contrast, one was only allowed to fell 
secondary forest of no more than five or six years old for the purpose of shifting 
cultivation.
118
 As was the case for Malay Malaysians, it should be noted that entrepreneurs 
were often engaged in all three industries with the lucrativeness of an industry determining 
their focus.
119
 Second, there were multiple instances of Dayaks owning shophouses in 
Sarawak.
120
 Ooi argues that these shophouses were generally not operated by the Dayaks 
themselves, but let to Chinese Malaysians. Third, those Ibans who had earned sufficient 
capital through other entrepreneurial activities utilized this by lending to Chinese charging 
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high interest rates.
121
 A 1922 monthly report from Bintulu, Sarawak, makes mention of a 
Chinese shopkeeper who owed more than $600 to six different Dayaks, while another owed 
$650 to one Dayak alone.
122
 
  
Chinese Malaysians 
Unlike Malay Malaysians in Malaya and other indigenous Malaysians in Borneo, Chinese 
Malaysian entrepreneurs could not benefit from being part of the largest group in any of the 
colonies and protectorates. Chinese did, however, constitute the largest ethnic group (48.0%) 
in the Straits Settlement of Penang in 1934,
123
 as well as the Federated Malay State of 
Selangor (42.6%) in 1921.
124
 Additionally, Chinese Malaysian businessmen had the 
advantage of being represented by members of their own group in administrations of the SS, 
FMS, UMS, Sarawak and BNB. In BNB they were even the only non-European group with 
political representation.
125
 
 This representation did not lead to a position in land policies anywhere close to 
resembling that enjoyed by indigenous communities. With the colonial administration taking 
the view that Malays were the only permanent rural population of Malaya, it was only natural 
to entrust this group with providing local food requirements.
126
 According to Ooi, the 
government of Sarawak consciously sought to obstruct the expansion of Chinese holdings,
127
 
but the primary sources reveal policies to be relatively lenient towards Chinese Malaysians. 
On multiple occasions during the period under review, land was made available for Chinese to 
cultivate paddy, even involving holdings which were formerly planted by Dayaks.
128
 The 
administration was not opposed to dealings in land between Chinese Malaysians and 
indigenes for other purposes either, with the natural exception of land designated native 
holding prior to 1933 and native area thereafter.
129
 Tax exemptions for plantations,
130
 making 
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land available for the cultivation of rubber
131
 and the subsidization of pepper gardens
132
 
similarly do not fit Ooi’s description. At the same time, it is telling that Chinese Malaysians 
constituted 25% of the population in 1939, but only had access to ten percent of the total land 
area.
133
 
 The Chartered Company administration in BNB held the opinion that indigenes were 
not to be recruited to work on plantations because this would disturb their traditional way of 
life. Therefore, the protectorate was in need of foreign labour; a requirement it sought to fulfil 
by attracting immigrants from China.
134
 For this purpose, the fares of settlers were paid; they 
were supplied with agricultural land and received cash advances.
135
 Aforementioned policies 
only applied to those Chinese newly settling the state, but the exemption from paying road 
rate on any agricultural holdings with a maximum size of ten acres applied to all Chinese 
Malaysians.
136
 
 The lack of a privileged position in colonial land policies, may actually have worked 
to the benefit of Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurial interests, because it gave the group more 
leeway to freely pursue activities other than the cultivation of food crops. Consequently, they 
came to own over half of the area under rubber smallholdings in Malaya by 1939; the 
smallholder sector constituted 38.7% of total rubber acreage. Chinese Malaysian interests in 
the estate sector were particularly smaller at 9.4%. The technologies in use on smallholdings 
were primitive and similar to those used by Malay Malaysians but Chinese Malaysian 
entrepreneurs generally managed to produce rubber of higher quality, because they paid more 
attention to the proper maintenance of trees.
137
 It is more difficult to determine the importance 
of ethnic Chinese rubber cultivators in Sarawak, with Ooi arguing that they ‘maintained a pre-
eminent position’;138 while Kaur writes that the majority of rubber was cultivated on 
indigenous-owned holdings. It is clear, however, that Chinese-owned holdings were generally 
larger than those under indigenous ownership averaging 2.5 ha as opposed to 0.6 ha.
139
 In 
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BNB the industry was dominated by British-owned estates, Chinese Malaysian ownership 
being limited to a few large estates as well as a larger number of smallholdings.
140
 
 The production of cash crops was not limited to rubber; Chinese Malaysians held a 
virtual monopoly in the cultivation of cloves,
141
 pepper,
142
 tapioca
143
  and tobacco,
144
 while 
also producing coffee,
145
 tea,
146
 paddy,
147
 sago,
148
 vegetables
149
 and various types of fruit, 
including coconuts.
150
 Additionally, the rearing of pigs and poultry was mainly executed by 
this group. As was mentioned above, Malay Malaysians also supplied poultry and eggs to the 
market, but they mainly did so to accumulate additional income; the ownership of large 
poultry farms was a Chinese preserve.
151
 
 Shifting the focus to other entrepreneurial activities in the primary sector, the primary 
sources tell us that Chinese Malaysians constituted the second largest single group of 
fishermen in the SS, including Singapore, and the FMS in 1927, 1929, 1934 and 1938.
152
 In 
Sarawak Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurs came to control gold mining operations at Bau 
after the British agency house Borneo Company Limited had surrendered its exclusive right to 
mine for gold in 1921. This industry experienced a short boom in the first half of the 1930s 
but waned thereafter.
153
 In tin mining they held the leading position up until 1928 accounting 
for two-thirds of tin acreage and 51% of production, down from 57% three years earlier. With 
the onset of the Great Depression Chinese entrepreneurs gradually lost ground to British 
business interests. The British generally operated large mines using dredges which enabled 
them to produce more cost-efficient, than Chinese producers who mostly resorted to lode 
mining
154
 or utilised gravel pumps. The tin industry was already confronted by a slump in 
1920-1922, but at this point in time marginal producers were aided by government purchases 
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of tin against a set price.
155
 This relative decline in tin extraction was accompanied by an 
absolute decline in tin smelting.
156
  
 The timber industry of BNB was characterized by a similar division with European 
firms utilising logging engines and railways, while Chinese continued to rely on hand logging. 
In this case, however, the latter production method proved more economical, leading 
European companies to resort more to this method as well in the 1930s. The timber industry 
was largely controlled by two British firms, the British Borneo Timber Company and the 
North Borneo Trading Company, which accounted for 79.3% of exports in 1937. This 
dominance is explained by the fact that the Timber Company had a monopoly on the 
protectorate’s timber resources, necessitating others to file for a license with the company 
before being allowed to operate.
157
 In Sarawak, by contrast, Chinese interests ‘possessed a 
near-monopoly of the timber industry’.158 
 In contrast to Malay Malaysian and other indigenous Malaysians, Chinese Malaysian 
entrepreneurs did have a stake in local manufacturing, be it predominantly in food processing. 
According to Fukuda all paddy in Malaya was processed by Chinese-owned rice mills,
159
 
although primary sources show that there were also a number of government-owned mills in 
the FMS.
160
 The milling of tapioca, production of coconut oil and canning of pineapples on 
the peninsula were similarly said to be controlled by Chinese businessmen; cans were 
produced in-house. Towards the end of the period under review Chinese interests expanded to 
the machine and ironworks industry.
161
  In Sarawak, sago flour was produced by Chinese 
factories.
162
 
 Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurial activities were not limited to the cultivation and 
processing of goods; the group played a key role in domestic commerce. According to Fukuda 
virtually all retail trade in Malaya was handled by Chinese middlemen,
163
 this was similarly 
the case in BNB
164
 and Sarawak.
165
 Chinese Malaysians had a competitive edge over 
indigenes because they could rely on a strong business network.
166
 In Sarawak, an extensive 
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trade network connected middlemen in outstations, responsible for buying goods from 
producers, to merchant houses in Kuching, which forwarded goods to shopkeepers throughout 
the territory, or alternatively to their counterparts in Singapore. Parallel to this, there ran a 
credit chain from Singapore banks and merchant houses to merchants in Sarawak.
167
 Between 
1903 and 1932 fifteen Chinese banks were established in Malaya including Singapore. Credit 
was not solely used by entrepreneurs to finance investments, but also to lend against higher 
interest rates to those without access to capital.
168
 
 
Indian Malaysians  
Neither the benefit of numerical dominance nor that of strong political representation could 
support Indian Malaysian entrepreneurs in gaining a competitive edge over their compatriots 
of different ethnic origin. According to Mahajani 86% of the Indians living in Malaya, 
including Singapore, in 1939 were engaged in unskilled labour and a further 10% in skilled 
and semi-skilled jobs; only 4% earned their money in trade and commerce or the 
professions.
169
 The majority of Indian Malaysians engaged in manual labour worked for 
wages on estates.
170
 
 Given the dominance of estate labourers amongst Indian Malaysians, it is not 
surprising that this group attracted the most attention from government. In 1920 the chairman 
of the United Planters’ Association of Malaya urged government officials that more action 
should be taken to induce Indian labourers to stay in the colony in order to secure a reliable 
supply of labour for estates. The colonial administration, however, remained reluctant to make 
land available for this purpose. That being said, the Labour Code did obligate estate managers 
to set aside land holdings for their labourers, but this was barely enforced in practice.
171
  
 
Table 3: Co-operative societies for Indian estate labourers, end of 1938 
 Societies Members Share capital  
(Straits dollars) 
FMS 267 49,383 $1,470,348 
Malacca 37 6,084 $198,804 
Penang 21 3,269 $120,483 
Singapore 13 2,384 $112,101 
Source: Based on FMS: Fraser, Federated Malay States: 1938, 100; SS: Small, Straits 
Settlements: 1938, 87. 
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From the late 1920s, an effort was made to support Indian estate labourers financially 
through government-promoted cooperative societies. By the end of 1938, 338 of such 
societies with 61,120 members and a share capital of 1,901,736 Straits dollars existed in the 
FMS, Malacca, Penang and Singapore (Table 3). As the total amount of Indian labourers in 
Malaya, including Singapore, was 214,610 one has to conclude that the cooperative 
movement was only partly successful. Although actual coverage may have been larger; it is 
unclear whether there were any societies for Indian estate labourers in the UMS.
172
 
Government support for the development of entrepreneurship amongst other Indian 
Malaysians was even more limited, but this did not withhold them from obtaining a prominent 
position in a number of industries. Rural Indians were the main producers of goat meat and 
dairy products in the SS, while their urban counterparts excelled in tailoring and the laundry 
business. According to a 1938 annual report for the SS, government sought to improve the 
system of dairying used by Indian Malaysian entrepreneurs, but does not specify on the exact 
actions taken towards this end.
173
 Indian Malaysians were also active in the Malayan fishing 
industry, be it less prominently; they constituted the third largest single group of fishermen in 
the SS, including Singapore, and the FMS in 1927. In 1929, 1934 and 1938 they were 
outnumbered by Japanese fishermen, thus making them the fourth largest group.
174
  
 As was mentioned above, Indian Malaysians were an important source of labour for 
rubber estates, but they also acted as owners of these estates; at the end of 1938, estates of 100 
acres and over covered a total of 206,858 acres in the SS, including Singapore, of which 
12,036 acres was under Indian ownership.
175
 In Malacca, but this presumably applied to the 
rest of the peninsula as well, most of these estates were owned by members of the Chettiar 
caste.
176
 This group managed to accumulate agricultural holdings through its moneylending 
activities with loans being made on the security of land.
177
  
In 1930 alone Chettiar loans to peasants amounted to 125 million Straits dollars.
178
 
According to Harper, they were the main source of credit for rural Malays during the interwar 
period, more so than Chinese moneylenders.
179
 This may have been the case in terms of the 
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value of capital, but the groups fulfilled two different functions: the Chinese tended to 
specialize in providing small sums of short-term credit secured by crops, while Chettiars dealt 
in larger sums. The capital used for lending activities commonly originated from three 
different sources. First, moneylenders were required to contribute a capital tax to the funds of 
their local temple, which in turn enabled them to obtain credit at interest rates lower than 
those at normal banks.
180
 Second, since western banks considered Chettiars to be 
‘responsible’ lenders they were willing to lend them money. Third, money was earned 
through other business activities such as the cultivation and processing of crops, and trading. 
The practice to securitize loans with fixed capital led their interest in these sectors to increase 
as time went by.
181
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2. 1945-1957: diversification and rural development 
 
Even though the Japanese occupation did not have such far-reaching consequences for 
Malaysia as it did for the Netherlands Indies, it certainly stimulated the Colonial Office to 
make a number of administrative innovations. Roughly speaking, these innovations were 
aimed at centralizing political power and preparing local inhabitants for independence by 
gradually increasing the extent of self-government. In Malaya this entailed the merger of the 
FMS, UMS and Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca into the Malayan Union in April 
1946 and subsequently into the Federation of Malaya on 1 February 1948.
182
  
The central government of the Federation comprised an executive branch, the Federal 
Executive Council and a legislative branch, the Federal Legislative Council, both chaired by 
the same British High Commissioner. Apart from the High Commissioner, the Federal 
Executive Council consisted of three ex officio members, four official members and seven 
members not affiliated with the bureaucracy of whom three were Malay Malaysians, two 
Chinese Malaysians, one Indian Malaysian and one European. The three ex officio members 
were also seated in the Federal Legislative Council where they were accompanied by thirteen 
officials, sultans from the nine states and fifty members representing various functional and 
ethnic groups.
183
 Initially, all members were appointed by the High Commissioner, but this 
changed in July 1955 when representative members were chosen through direct elections. The 
elections ended in a decisive victory for the Alliance, a coalition that comprised three 
communally-based political parties: the UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 
and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).
184
 
 As was the case prior to the Pacific War, the Malay sultans remained a potent force in 
national politics. This was not only the case because they were seated in the Federal 
Legislative Council, but also because the federal constitution delegated powers on matters 
relating to the Islam and customs of Malays to political institutions on the state-level over 
which the sultans presided. Moreover, only in case of urgency was the High Commissioner 
allowed to bring a bill before the Legislative Council without first informing them about the 
content of this bill.
185
 
 Meanwhile, Sarawak officially became a Crown Colony on 1 July 1946, 
approximately one year after Rajah Charles Vyner Brooke had ceded the country to Great 
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Britain.
186
 Colonial status was accompanied by a larger role for the General Council or 
Council Negri than was the case during the preceding period; the council, comprising fourteen 
official members from the Sarawak Civil Service and eleven members representing the 
various communities, became the legislative branch of government. Executive power was 
vested in the Supreme Council, which consisted of a minimum of five members, the majority 
of whom concerned officials seated in the Council Negri. The government was headed by a 
British Governor, who was also charged with appointing members for both the Council Negri 
and the Supreme Council.
187
  
This situation persisted until 3 August 1956 when a new constitution was promulgated 
in Sarawak. Under the Sarawak (Constitution) Order, 1956, the number of members in the 
Council Negri was expanded to forty-two: fourteen ex-officio members, twenty-four elected 
members and four members appointed by the Governor to represent those interests lacking 
adequate representation. Elected members were not chosen through direct elections, but 
indirectly from and by members of twenty-four local assemblies for which elections were 
held. Ten members of the Council Negri also had a seat in the remodelled Supreme Council, 
namely three ex-officio members, five unofficial members, chosen by the elected members of 
the legislative branch, and two members nominated by the Governor. Since Governors usually 
chose an unofficial member as one of their nominees, these constituted a majority in both 
branches. Constitutional reform, then, substantially increased the influence of the local 
population on policymaking, but simultaneously expanded the power of the Governor 
enabling him to pursue policies opposed by the Supreme Council.
188
  
 In BNB, which was unified with the former Straits Settlement of Labuan to become 
the Crown Colony of North Borneo on 18 July 1946, the Governor’s power was practically 
without checks until October 1950 when an Executive and a Legislative Council were 
instituted. The Executive Council constituted three ex officio members, two officials and three 
unofficial members nominated by the Governor, whereas the Legislative Council consisted of 
three ex officio members, nine officials and ten unofficial nominees.
189
 
 The size of the population inhabiting these territories was 5,786,000 in 1947, 
increasing to 8,216,000 thirteen years later. A large majority of the population, 84.8% in 
1947, continued to live on the peninsula with 9.4% living in Sarawak and a further 5.7% in 
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BNB.
190
 When comparing the ethnic distribution of the population around 1950 (Table 4) 
with that twenty years earlier, two observations can be made. First, Malay Malaysians 
remained the largest ethnic group, followed by Chinese Malaysians, other indigenous 
Malaysians and Indian Malaysians. Second, only the Chinese Malaysian group grew as a 
share of the population, while all other groups shrank. In Sarawak Iban people constituted 
34.8% of the population, Land Dayaks 7.7% and Melanaus 6.5%. In BNB, Dusuns continued 
to be the largest indigenous group with 35.3%, followed by the Bajau people with 13.4% and 
Muruts with 5.6%; other indigenes, including Malay Malaysians, comprised 18.5%.
191
 
 
Table 4: Population of Malaysia by ethnic group, c. 1950
192
 
 Federation of 
Malaya (1947) 
Sarawak 
(1947) 
British North 
Borneo 
(1951) 
Malaysia 
(estimate) 
Chinese 1,884,534 
(38.4%) 
145,158 
(26.6%) 
74,374 
(22.3%) 
2,104,066 
(36.3%) 
Europeans … 691 (0.1%) … 691 (0.0%) 
Europeans and 
Eurasians 
… … 1,213 (0.4%) 1,213 (0.0%) 
Indians 530,638 
(10.8%) 
… … 530,638 (9.2%) 
Malays 2,427,834 
(49.5%) 
97,469 
(17.8%) 
… 2,525,303 
(43.6%) 
Malays and 
other 
indigenous 
Malaysians 
… … 243,009 
(72.7%) 
243,009 (4.2%) 
Other 
indigenous 
Malaysians 
… 297,948 
(54.5%) 
… 297,948 (5.1%) 
Others 65,080 (1.3%) 5,119 
(0.9%) 
15,545 (4.7%) 85,744 (1.5%) 
Total 4,908,086 
(100%) 
546,385 
(100%) 
334,141 
(100%) 
5,788,612 
(100%) 
           Source: See note 192. 
 
While the ending of the Pacific War signalled a break with the past in political terms, 
its impact on Malaysia’s place in the world economy was less pronounced. Trade statistics for 
the Federation of Malaya show that exports of rubber and tin accounted for 76.0% of the 
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value of total exports in 1950; rubber alone accounted for 69.4%.
193
 This was almost exactly 
the same three years later when the two products constituted 76.1%, although the share of tin 
rose to 22% and that of rubber fell to 54%.
194
 Crude and refined oil remained Sarawak’s 
principal export products throughout the period under review.
195
 This industry was foreign-
controlled by Royal Dutch Shell and had only limited significance for the development of 
local entrepreneurship. Crude oil was also the colony’s principal import product, being 
imported from neighbouring Brunei.
196
 Leaving oil out of the equation, rubber was the most 
important export product between 1949 and 1952 and again in 1956 and 1957, while the value 
of pepper exports was higher in 1953; the other year for which data is available.
197
 Rubber 
similarly ranked first in BNB’s exports with copra ranking second until 1952 and timber in 
the period thereafter.
198
  
 
199
 
  Source: See note 199. 
 
Malaysia’s role in the world economy is reflected in the continued dominance of the 
unprocessed primary sector in the domestic economy (Figure 4). This was most pronounced 
in Sarawak where it employed 75.1% of the working population; the tertiary sector employed 
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24.1% and the secondary sector a mere 0.8%. Corresponding figures were respectively 69.6%, 
22.2% and 8.2% for the Federation of Malaya, and 63.4%, 35.0% and 1.6% for BNB. 
 
Malay Malaysians  
Since Malay Malaysian entrepreneurs belonged to the largest ethnic group on the peninsula, 
one would expect the democratization of Malayan politics to work to their benefit. In practice, 
however, it was the aristocracy rather than the entrepreneurial class who was the main 
beneficiary of these reforms for two reasons. First, the federal structure ensured a lasting role 
for sultans in national politics.
200
 Second, the leaders of the largest political party, the UMNO, 
were members of the elite themselves; Tunku Abdul Rahman, the party’s leader from 1951 
until 1970, was, for example, a member of the Kedah royal family.
201
 In Sarawak, the Malay 
elite lost its traditional position in politics, but here Malay Malaysians constituted too small a 
share of the population for entrepreneurs to benefit.
202
 
 Given the continued dominance of Malay Malaysian aristocrats in Malayan politics, 
policies regulating entrepreneurship were not dissimilar from those pursued in the earlier 
period. On the matter of land policies, Malay Malaysians could still count upon preferential 
access to land either through Malay reservations, in the states were these already existed, or 
customary tenure.
203
 However, as Arifin argues, the total acreage of Malay reservation land 
was on the decline since 1940 with land being made available for tin mining.
204
 As was the 
case prior to the Japanese occupation there did not exist a common land policy for the whole 
of the peninsula, because land utilization was constitutionally delegated to the governments of 
the various sultanates and settlements.
205
  
 These land policies had a clear rationale being aimed at fulfilling one of the national 
development goals: an increase in domestic food production.
206
 For this same purpose, the 
colonial administration forged ahead in increasing the acreage of irrigated paddy land. By 
1953 irrigation schemes carried out under the auspices of the Drainage and Irrigation 
Department covered 292,780 acres, or 37.3% of the total area under wet paddy, while another 
117,000 acres were in the process of being irrigated.
207
 The source of finance for irrigation 
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schemes depended on their size with large works being paid from federal funds and small 
ones from state funds; direct contributions from proprietors were no longer expected.
208
 
During the 1950s, a number of schemes to make tractors available to rice growers were 
financed by the Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA), which was established 
in 1950.
209
 From a macroeconomic point of view, these policies proved successful as an 
increase in paddy production of fourteen percent between 1950 and 1958
210
 reduced rice 
imports.
211
 At the same time, however, these initiatives failed to make rice production a more 
profitable entrepreneurial activity; according to Harper ‘the average income of planters in 
1960 remained the same as it had been in 1947.’212 
Government efforts were not limited to supporting rural Malays growing paddy with 
RIDA’s activities ranging from lending money and supplying boats to fishermen to 
establishing factories for the processing of smallholders’ rubber and educating Malay village 
headmen.
213
 Each year, a limited number of these had the opportunity to follow a course at the 
College of Agriculture; total enrolment in 1950 was 73. During this course they received 
instructions on the use of mechanical equipment, the extraction of palm oil and the cultivation 
of rubber, tea, coffee and Manila hemp.
214
  
In addition, a rubber replanting scheme, in operation between 1 July 1955 and 30 June 
1962, supplied direct grants of 600 Malayan dollars to smallholders for every acre they were 
planning to replant. Even though this scheme applied to all plantations irrespective of size or 
the ethnicity of their owners, Malay Malaysian smallholders were its main beneficiaries for 
two reasons. First, regarding the size of plantations, the grant received by estates was $200 
lower and could only be used to cover 21% of the initial acreage. Moreover, there was a larger 
need for replanting on smallholdings, than on estates where these activities had been well 
under way before the scheme’s introduction.215 Second, regarding ethnicity, Malays 
controlled 56.5% of the total acreage under smallholdings.
216
 The large need for replantings is 
exemplified by a fourteen percent decrease in smallholder rubber production between 1950 
and 1958.
217
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Table 5: Cooperative societies for rural Malays in Malaya, 1950 
 Societies Members Share capital 
(Malayan dollars) 
Rural Credit Societies 311 8,248 $261,373 
Seasonal Co-
operative Credit 
Societies 
88 2,162 $49,040 
Fishermen’s Societies 7 344 $4,213 
Total 406 10,754 $314,626 
Source: Based on CO, Federation of Malaya: 1950, 46-48. 
 
Apart from paying subsidies, government sought to support rural Malays financially 
through the continued promotion of cooperatives. As was the case during the preceding period 
the success of these financial institutions, mainly catering for short-term credit, remained 
limited.
218
 In 1950, there were 406 societies with 10,754 members and a total share capital of 
314,626 Malayan dollars (Table 5). Moneylenders, then, remained the main source of capital 
for most Malay Malaysian entrepreneurs and rural indebtedness was rampant.
219
  
 
Table 6: Land ownership in Malaya by ethnic group, 1950s (million acres) 
 Chinese Europeans Indians Malays Total 
Smallholdings 0.80 - 0.10 1.85 2.75 
Medium 
holdings 
0.35 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.52 
Estates 0.27 1.60 0.05 - 1.92 
Total 1.42 1.63 0.28 1.86 5.19 
Source: Based on Puthucheary, Ownership and control, xvii. 
 
Overall, one must conclude that the government policies listed here were largely 
unsuccessful in strengthening the position of Malay Malaysian entrepreneurs. Puthucheary 
argues that Malay Malaysian ownership was generally confined to smallholdings used for the 
cultivation of paddy, rubber and coconuts; they owned 1.86 million acres of the 5.19 million 
acres under cultivation on the peninsula, which was more than any other group, but their 
ownership of land on medium holdings and estates was negligible (Table 6). By contrast, few 
Malays were said to be engaged in commerce and essentially none in mining and 
manufacturing.
220
 That being said, Malay Malaysian entrepreneurs did manage to strengthen 
their position as middlemen in the fishing industry.
221
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 Although legislation specifically aimed at positively discriminating Malay Malaysians 
was not imposed in BNB and Sarawak, entrepreneurs in the latter colony could nonetheless 
benefit from the prevailing policy climate by strengthening their position in fish farming and 
commerce. In the former case, they were able to do so through direct government support; the 
Agricultural Department sought to increase the domestic production of freshwater fish by 
aiding indigenous entrepreneurs, including Malay Malaysians, with constructing ponds and 
supplying them with fish.
222
 As to commerce, with government no longer considering it an 
unsuitable activity, there was an increase in the number of Malays opening a shop
223
 or 
applying for a hawking license.
224
 
 
Other indigenous Malaysians 
More than for any other group, the period under review was associated with a significant 
increase in political power for the various indigenous peoples living in BNB and Sarawak. 
Although they were mainly represented by members of the aristocracy, rather than 
entrepreneurs,
225
 one would expect policies to be more in the interest of indigenous 
entrepreneurs, than those before the Japanese Occupation when the group was essentially 
excluded from administration.
226
 
 Political representation did not lead to an immediate change in land policies as the 
British chose to maintain the framework already instituted by the Brookes in Sarawak and the 
BNBCC in BNB. Consequently, land in Sarawak was still divided into mixed zones and 
native areas,
227
 and indigenes in BNB could obtain land with a maximum size of fifteen acres 
to grow paddy since they possessed customary rights.
228
 In 1957 150,000 acres of land were 
held under native customary rights. The effect of this regulation was in practice limited to 
protecting interests of existing landowners, because all land in ‘littoral districts’ was already 
in use.
229
 
 By contrast, there was a clear alteration in government policies regulating shifting 
cultivation. In BNB this had already been subject to restrictions, but the colonial government 
sought to gradually eradicate the practice by inducing indigenes living in the hills to adopt a 
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different method of cultivation. For this purpose, a scheme was initiated to resettle families in 
lowland areas.
230
 A similar policy was adopted in Sarawak, where 5,000 acres of irrigated 
paddy land was set aside for shifting cultivators. These, however, were rather reluctant to 
abandon their traditional lifestyle. The cultivation of wet paddy instead of hill paddy would 
have made sense from an entrepreneurial point of view, since the former obtained higher 
yields;
231
 in BNB the yield of wet paddy was 0.92 tons
232
 per acre, whereas hill paddy only 
yielded 0.47 tons per acre.
233
 It must be noted that the government of Sarawak was not 
opposed to indigenes growing hill paddy per se,
234
 experiments were carried out to improve 
the crop’s yield,235 but there were two problems associated with it. First, if not carried out 
correctly, it could cause erosion.
236
 Second, shifting cultivation complicated the issue of new 
land titles, because land that was not being cultivated could nonetheless be held under 
customary tenure.
237
  
 Government encouragement to cultivate wet instead of hill paddy was one of the 
policies pursued to raise domestic rice output, a development objective the Borneo territories 
shared with the Federation of Malaya.
238
 In addition, a Padi Purchasing Scheme was started in 
Sarawak in 1946 and in BNB three years later involving the purchase of surplus paddy from 
cultivators against a guaranteed price and building a food reserve which could be used in 
times of need.
239
 Moreover, this period witnessed the advent of irrigation schemes in the 
Borneo territories.
240
 It is unclear how many acres these schemes covered, but the Sarawak 
development plan for 1955-1960 tells us that irrigation using small diesel pumps had ‘been 
introduced in nearly all Divisions
 ‘
.
241
  
As the rice imports of BNB and Sarawak did not show a decreasing trend between 
1948 and 1957, one has to conclude that these policies were not particularly successful in 
reaching self-sufficiency (Figure 5), nor did they stimulate indigenous Malaysian 
entrepreneurs to use more land for the cultivation of rice. While the acreage under wet paddy 
in BNB grew from 44,573 acres in 1951 to 45,350 in 1957, total paddy acreage actually fell 
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from 76,097 acres to 74,648 acres.
242
 At the same time, imports in 1957 were lower than in 
1951, reflecting higher yields in rice cultivation. 
  
243 
Source: See note 243. 
 
The fluctuations in rice imports may be explained by the fact that indigenous 
Malaysians still tended to concentrate on the cultivation of one crop or another depending on 
profitability.
244
 Increases in rice imports in 1950 and 1951 were associated with soaring 
rubber prices caused by the Korean War.
245
 The authorities could have prevented this if they 
had discouraged the cultivation of cash crops among indigenous Malaysian entrepreneurs, but 
they decided not to do so. Instead, they encouraged a ‘mixed system of farming’246 and 
multiple schemes were started in support of this group. 
 In Sarawak rubber smallholders were supplied with high-yielding planting material 
and received grants to compensate for the loss of income as a consequence of the replacement 
of old rubber trees by new ones.
247
 Even though this scheme did not only apply specifically to 
indigenous smallholders, the group was an important beneficiary owning 80% of holdings 
under 100 acres and 49% of total rubber acreage in 1952; the average size of an indigenous 
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holding was 1.46 acres.
248
 The Agricultural Department similarly supplied pepper shoots to 
planters,
249
 enabling Dayaks to get a foothold in an industry which used to be controlled by 
Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurs.
250
 The Dayaks were aided in their endeavours by the large 
demand for pepper in the world market, causing the price margin between white pepper and 
black pepper, which required a less intensive production process, to narrow.
251
  Concentration 
on low quality pepper, however, did force a relatively large number of them to abandon the 
crop when prices dropped in 1957.
252
 To prevent this from happening to Melanaus producing 
sago, the government adopted the Sago Flour (Control Exports) Ordinance 1948, which only 
permitted the export of sago flour that reached ‘a specified minimum standard of quality’.253 
In BNB, by contrast, only indigenes growing tobacco received support; a 1951 annual report 
tells us that a group of planters followed a course about improved cultivation methods on a 
tobacco estate.
254
 
 The large role of indigenous Malaysians in the administration of Sarawak compared to 
BNB resulted in the group getting more support in growing cash crops. In addition, the 
Agricultural Department in the former white sultanate enabled Land Dayaks to become fish 
farmers by supplying fish and helping them with constructing ponds,
255
 while the Co-
operative Development Department promoted the use of cooperatives.
256
 In 1954 there were 
137 societies with 9,330 members and a share capital of $268,735. Different from the 
Federation of Malaya, where cooperatives lent money to members on an individual basis, 
societies in Sarawak stored their capital in the Co-operative Central Bank, registered in 
October 1953.
257
 Despite receiving a $250,000 interest-free government loan in 1957,
258
 
however, it was not able to supply credit until 1962.
259
 
 Although this period did not bring about any significant changes in the position of 
indigenous Malaysian entrepreneurs, four developments are worth mentioning. First, the 
Bajau, whose entrepreneurial activities were originally confined to fishing and growing wet 
paddy,
260
 managed to diversify into cattle-farming; a 1957 annual report for North Borneo 
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even deemed this their ‘most important contribution’ to the economy.261 Second, indigenes set 
up six small scale sawmills in BNB.
262
 Third, in the sago industry hand rasping was gradually 
being replaced by machine rasping. Large growers were able to buy machines for their 
individual use, while others formed a syndicate.
263
 That growers had sufficient capital at their 
disposal to purchase engine driven mills shows that considerable profits could be made from 
the cultivation of sago, but these were often not high enough to prevent Melanaus from 
running into debts with Chinese moneylenders during slumps.
264
 Fourth, while the position of 
indigenous Malaysian entrepreneurs in the tertiary sector remained weak, there was some 
improvement noticeable. In BNB indigenes sold their produce in traditional markets or tamu 
held in most rural villages, instead of relying on middlemen. In addition, the shops in such 
villages were usually owned by indigenous entrepreneurs, with Malaysian Chinese focussing 
on commerce in larger settlements.
265
 In Sarawak more shops were opened by Dayaks,
266
 who 
increasingly chose to operate these themselves instead of renting it to members of the Chinese 
community.
267
  
 
Chinese Malaysians 
Above I argued that the strength of the business network of Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurs 
combined with relatively laissez-faire government policies enabled them to play a prominent 
role in the Malaysian economy. Even though democratization principally worked to the 
benefit of the Malays in Malaya and other indigenous Malaysians on Borneo, we may expect 
that the new political constellation did not have a negative effect on Chinese business interests 
for three reasons. First, Chinese Malaysians remained a potent force in politics. In the 
Federation of Malaya the MCA, whose leadership mainly comprised wealthy Chinese 
businessmen, managed to become part of the ruling coalition even though Malay Malaysians 
constituted 49% of the population and more than 80% of the electorate in 1955;
268
 many 
Chinese did not qualify for citizenship since they could not speak Malay or English.
269
 The 
UMNO nonetheless decided to cooperate with the MCA because the British would not grant 
independence to Malaya if the government was dominated by one single ethnic group. 
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Moreover, the party was dependent upon financial support by the Chinese;
270
 one of the 
founders of the MCA, H. S. Lee, was the main financier the campaign for the 1955 Federal 
Elections.
271
 Second, policies aimed at supporting Malay and other indigenous Malaysian 
entrepreneurs, were limited to the industries in which these groups already played an 
important role. Chinese Malaysians, then, were not confronted with unfair competition in 
other sectors. Third, since co-operatives proved largely unsuccessful, entrepreneurs remained 
dependent upon moneylenders. During the interwar period, Chettiars were the main source of 
credit for rural Malays, but after the Japanese occupation the Chinese ranked first.
272
  
 Chinese ascendancy was not limited to moneylending with businessmen increasingly 
investing in Malaya, because it was no longer possible to invest in China after the Communist 
Party came to power in 1949. As a result, 53% of Malayan rubber estates in 1957 were under 
Chinese Malaysian ownership, compared to 40% ten years earlier. At the same time, 
European estates still covered two-thirds of total acreage.
273
 In addition, Chinese Malaysians 
came to own 13.2% of the area under oil palms.
274
 In the tin mining sector, Chinese continued 
to rely on gravel pumps, which gave them a competitive edge over their European 
counterparts in the early post-war years because it required less capital and time to restart 
damaged mines. Their share of production rose from 30% in the years prior to the Japanese 
Occupation, to 40% thereafter;
275
 it stood at 38.5% in 1950
276
 and 38.8% two years later.
277
 
There are no statistics available for the production of freshwater fish farms, but primary 
sources suggest that Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurs were dominant in this new industry.
278
 
In Sarawak the manufacturing interests of Chinese Malaysians expanded to include factories 
producing such products as arrack, bricks, matches, pottery and vermicelli.
279
 
 Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurs did not remain completely untouched by government 
policies. It is probable that tin miners would have gradually lost market share to their 
European counterparts, if it were not for the Federation’s membership of the International Tin 
Agreement which came into force in 1956. As part of this agreement a buffer stock was 
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established to prevent strong price fluctuations, thus protecting the less efficient Chinese 
producers.
280
 Furthermore, Chinese in Malaya and Sarawak were encouraged to become 
members of cooperatives, a privilege previously reserved to Malays and Indian estate 
labourers.
281
 In Malaya this was part of a larger campaign to win the hearts and minds of 
Chinese peasants in order to prevent them from supporting the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP). In addition, the authorities went on to resettle nearly 600,000 people, 86% of them 
Chinese, in so-called New Villages between 1948 and 1955.
282
  
Resettlement had a negative effect on the business interests of Chinese smallholders 
who had played an important role in the economy through the cultivation of rubber and 
vegetables, and the breeding of pigs. An economic survey for Malaya tells us that the area 
under food crops, excluding rice, declined from 95,727 acres in 1948, to 67,465 acres in 1951. 
By the end of 1953 this figure had only increased slightly to 82,082 acres. As a consequence, 
imports of fresh vegetables rose from 7,326 tons in 1948 to 12,860 tons three years later, 
while the export of pigs to Singapore shrank from 115,400 in 1949 to 37,542 in 1953.
283
 
According to Harper, three factors caused this development. First, there was a shortage of 
land that could be used for cultivation, either because there was no unoccupied land near New 
Villages, or because state governments were reluctant to make land available for this purpose. 
Second, land that was made available was often of dubious quality. Third, growers, previously 
employing shifting cultivation, had trouble getting used to settled agriculture. Many of them, 
therefore, saw no other option than to seek employment on rubber estates. The demise of 
smallholders worked to the detriment of small traders, who were confronted with a decrease 
in tradeable produce.
284
  
The authorities in Sarawak sought to satisfy Chinese land-hunger by enlarging the area 
classified as mixed zone land. 29,000 Acres of agricultural land were added in 1951 and 
another 26,000 acres for the growing of rubber a year later. At that point in time, officials 
were convinced that these schemes were sufficient to satisfy demand,
285
 but five years later 
government was still in search for new blocks of land to be opened up for Chinese Malaysian 
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agriculturalists.
286
 In BNB, by contrast, it was only in 1957 that plans were made to make new 
land available to Chinese.
287
 
 
Indian Malaysians 
Although not targeted by new government initiatives it does not seem that Indian Malaysian 
entrepreneurship was disadvantaged since this group gained governmental representation, but 
the political influence of Indian Malaysian entrepreneurs was smaller than that of their 
Chinese counterparts. Indians constituted a significantly smaller part of the population and 
therefore held fewer seats in the various representative councils. Given the large number of 
seats allocated to functional groups in the Federal Legislative Council of Malaya it is difficult 
to make statements on the seats held by Indians before 1955,
288
 but of the fifty-two seats that 
were won by the Alliance in the Federal elections in that year thirty-five went to the UMNO, 
fifteen to the MCA and only two to the MIC.
289
 In addition, the leadership of the MIC mainly 
comprised left-leaning members of the middle class, rather than businessmen.
290
 That being 
said, White argues that the party also included wealthy entrepreneurs.
291
 
 
Table 7: Labourers’ Co-operative Credit Societies, Federation of Malaya 
 Societies Members Share capital 
(Malayan dollars) 
1949 380 35,333 $1,384,924 
1950 389 39,085 $1,118,097 
Source: Based on CO, Federation of Malaya: 1950, 48-49. 
 
As was the case during the preceding period, support for Indian Malaysians remained 
limited to cooperative societies for estate labourers, who constituted 23.1% of the Indians 
living in the Federation of Malaya in 1955.
292
 The number of these societies had grown since 
the Japanese Occupation, but both membership and share capital dwindled. In 1950 there 
were 389 societies with 39,085 and a share capital of $1,118,097 (Table 7); down from 338 
societies with 61,120 members and a share capital of $1,901,736 twelve years earlier (Table 
3). If one assumes that roughly 23% of Indian Malaysians in 1950 worked on estates, then 
only 30% of them held membership to a co-operative. This percentage was probably even 
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lower since Malay and Chinese labourers could also become members of Labourers’ Co-
operative Credit Societies.
293
 
 
Table 8: Distribution of finance and commerce-occupations by ethnic group 
in the Federation of Malaya, 1955 
 Chinese Indians Malays Others Total 
Banking & 
insurance 
4,829 (6.8%) 3,302 (16.6%) 2,442 (17.8%) 216 (13.2%) 10,789 
(10.1%) 
Produce 
dealers 
14,022 
(19.6%) 
1,408 (7.1%) 2,717 (19.8%) 273 (16.7%) 18,420 
(17.3%) 
Retail 
distributors 
38,954 
(54.6%) 
10,432 
(52.4%) 
6,839 (49.8%) 543 (33.2%) 56,768 
(53.2%) 
Others 13,596 
(19.0%) 
4,752 (23.9%) 1,728 (12.6%) 602 (36.8%) 20,678 
(19.4%) 
Total 71,401 
(100%) 
19,894 
(100%) 
13,726 
(100%) 
1,634 (100%) 106,655 
(100%) 
Source: Derived from Mahajani, Role of Indian minorities, 111.  
 
Despite the lack of government support, Indian Malaysian entrepreneurs were able to 
play an important role in finance and commerce on the peninsula. In 1955, Indians constituted 
the second largest group employed in this sector after the Chinese Malaysians (Table 8). Most 
of them were engaged in retail distribution, followed by other occupations, banking & 
insurance and dealing in produce. Relatively speaking, Indian Malaysians were best 
represented in banking and insurance which employed roughly ten percent of the people 
engaged in commerce, but 16.6% of the people from Indian descent. By contrast, even though 
17.3% of those having a commercial occupation were produce dealer, only 7.1% of the Indian 
Malaysians were so.  
The low incidence of produce dealing corresponds with a low incidence of land 
ownership among Indians, thus suggesting that making transactions with members of the own 
ethnic group was prevalent in this part of the supply chain. Not only did Indian Malaysians 
own less land than any of the other main ethnic groups in Malaya, ownership was also heavily 
concentrated. According to Puthucheary 75% of rubber smallholdings under Indian ownership 
were worked by tenants. Most land was held by Chettiars, who accumulated it through the 
defaulting of debtors.
294
  
The ascendancy of Chinese moneylenders as the main source of credit for rural 
Malays
295
 by no means led to the decline of Chettiars, but rather to a change in clientele; more 
money was lent to clerks and shopkeepers. According to Mahajani, the value of assets held by 
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this group on the peninsula in 1957 was considerably higher than in 1941, when it stood at 
270 million Malayan dollars.
296
 This may be explained by the successful venturing of Chettiar 
firms in southern India into import-substitution industrialization which made more capital 
available for banking purposes in Southeast Asia.
297
 
The Borneo territories remained outside the Chettiar’s business network, but judging 
from the primary sources Indian Malaysian entrepreneurship was on the rise here. While the 
pre-war sources only make mention of one trader who opened a shop in Sarawak,
298
 post-war 
sources indicate that Indian entrepreneurs had a controlling interest in the livestock industry 
of BNB and Sarawak. These ventures were, however, generally limited in size, particularly in 
Sarawak.
299
 In addition, they were employed as technicians, artisans and merchants;
300
 in 
Sarawak Indian Malaysians specialized in trading textiles.
301
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3. 1957-1970: independence and emergent affirmative action 
 
While the first twelve years after the Pacific War were characterized by democratization of 
the political system in Malaysia, it was only during the period under review here that the 
various territories obtained independence from the United Kingdom. In the Federation of 
Malaya, accelerated independence was to be expected after the Alliance sealed an 
overwhelming victory in the 1955 Federal Elections for four reasons. First, different from its 
political rival Parti Negara, the newly-established party of UMNO’s founder Dato Onn 
Jaafar, the Alliance sought to gain independence as soon as possible.
302
 Second, and 
connected to this, large electoral support served to show the colonial authorities that this 
desire was broadly shared among the citizens of Malaya.
303
 Third, cooperation between the 
three main ethnic groups which took place in the Alliance was an important precondition for 
independence.
304
 Fourth, the fact that the coalition was dominated by English-educated 
members of the upper-middle and upper class gave the British confidence that their extensive 
business interests in the country would be protected after independence.
305
  
 Consequently, the Federation of Malaya gained independence from the United 
Kingdom on 31 August 1957.
306
 Under the 1957 constitution, the country became a 
constitutional monarchy headed by one of the nine Malay sultans in the function of Yang di-
Pertuan Agong.
307
 The Yang di-Pertuan Agong was chosen for a five-year term by his fellow 
sultans in the Conference of Rulers without having the possibility of being re-elected. 
Normally, the honour was bestowed upon the longest serving sultan. Legislative power was 
vested in a bicameral parliament constituting the Dewan Negara or Senate and the Dewan 
Rakyat or House of Representatives. The Senate comprised 38 members of whom 22 were 
elected by the parliaments of the eleven states, which retained considerable authority, and 
sixteen by the monarch to serve those interests not properly represented. The House of 
Representatives counted 104 members, chosen through general elections. In the first elections 
after independence, held in 1959, the Alliance secured 73 seats. This enabled it to form a 
cabinet which assisted the Agong who had executive authority.
308
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 The Borneo territories had to wait until 1963 before they became independent, but this 
did not mean that they were excluded from administrative reforms before this time. In 
Sarawak the system of indirect elections for the Council Negri was maintained, but as of 1961 
voting rights were no longer confined to ‘adult married ratepayers and tenants’, instead every 
resident older than twenty-one was allowed to vote. In addition, the number of ex-officio 
members was reduced from fourteen to three, while nominated members gained eleven seats. 
Since the nominees included a minimum of four members not affiliated with the bureaucracy, 
this reform clearly increased the power of local inhabitants vis-à-vis colonial 
administrators.
309
 In BNB members not affiliated with the bureaucracy gained a majority over 
officials in the Legislative Council from 1960 and two years later they received two additional 
seats in the Executive Council.
310
 
 On 16 September 1963, the territories today constituting Malaysia became an 
administrative unity for the first time when the Borneo territories were unified with the 
Federation of Malaya to form the larger Federation of Malaysia. Singapore was also part of 
the new federation, but it left the country, either voluntarily or forced depending on one’s 
perspective, for political reasons in 1965.
311
 Sarawak and BNB (renamed Sabah) entered 
Malaysia as equal partners to the Federation of Malaya, thus granting them significantly more 
autonomy than the peninsular states. This involved control over finance and policies in the 
field of development, education, immigration and religion. In practice, however, the federal 
government did not hesitate to interfere in Bornean affairs if national unity was said to be 
threatened.
312
 
 As was the case in Malay states, legislative power in Sabah and Sarawak was vested 
with the State Legislative Assembly wholly made out of directly elected members. In the nine 
sultanates the sultan had executive authority, but on Borneo and in Penang and Malacca, this 
honour was bestowed upon a governor appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. They were 
in all cases assisted by the State Executive Council containing members of the largest 
coalition in the legislature. On the federal level Malaya retained 104 seats in the Dewan 
Rakyat, while an additional sixteen seats were allocated to Sabah and 24 to Sarawak. The 
Alliance remained the dominant force in politics, winning 89 seats in the first general 
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elections held in 1964.
313
 Five years later the coalition suffered an enormous defeat, when it 
only won 67 seats.
314
 It did, however, manage to gain an absolute majority of 92 seats after 
seeking support from a number of Bornean parties.
315
 
 
Table 9: Population of Malaysia by ethnic group, 1960316 
 Federation of 
Malaya (1960) 
Sarawak (1960) Sabah (1960) Malaysia 
(estimate) 
Chinese 2,595,000 (37.0%) 229,154 (30.8%) 104,542 (23.0%) 2,928,696 
(35.6%) 
Indians 787,000 (11.2%) … … 787,000 
(9.6%) 
Europeans … 1,631 (0.2%) 1,896 (0.4%) 3,527 (0.0%) 
Malays 3,510,000 (50.0%) 129,300 (17.4%) … 3,639,300 
(44.3%) 
Malays and other 
indigenous 
Malaysians 
… … 306,498 (67.4%) 306,498 
(3.7%) 
Other indigenous 
Malaysians 
… 377,952 (50.8%) … 377,952 
(4.6%) 
Others 126,000 (1.8%) 6,492 (0.9%) 41,485 (9.1%) 173,977 
(2.1%) 
Total 7,018,000 (100%) 744,529 (100%) 454,421 (100%) 8,216,950 
(100%) 
Source: FDoI, Malaysia: 1965, 60-61 and 631.  
 
Considering that 9.1% of the population of Malaysia in 1960 lived in Sarawak and 
5.5% in Sabah, it is worth noting that these territories were nonetheless allocated 16.7% and 
11.1% of the seats in the Dewan Rakyat, respectively. Compared to ten years earlier, Malay 
Malaysians remained the largest ethnic group in the country, followed by Chinese Malaysians 
(Table 9). While other indigenous Malaysians previously constituted the third largest group, 
they now ranked fourth behind the Indian Malaysians. In Sarawak 31.9% of the population 
was Iban, 7.7% Land Dayak and 6.0% Melanau. The Dusun people continued to be the largest 
indigenous group in Sabah with 32.0%, followed by Bajaus with 13.1% and Muruts with 
4.9%; other indigenes, including Malay Malaysians, comprised 17.5%.
317
 Even though the 
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size of the Chinese community as a share of the total population had declined, the contrary 
was the case on Borneo; in Sarawak it was the largest ethnic group from 1962 onwards.
318
 
 
319
 
 Source: See note 319. 
 
Political independence did not have an immediate effect on Malaysia’s place in the 
world economy. In Malaya rubber and tin remained the most important export products 
throughout the period under review, although their cumulative share did decrease from 81.7% 
in 1959 to 63.9% in 1970 (Figure 6). In Sarawak petroleum ranked first among the state’s 
export products, followed by rubber up until 1964 when it was surpassed by timber. By 1967 
the value of pepper exports was also higher than that of rubber; the latter fell from a peak at 
122.4 million Malaysian dollars in 1960 to $26.3 million in 1968, the last year for which data 
are available.
320
 A similar trend was discernible in the composition of Sabah’s exports with 
rubber being most important in 1957 and timber in the period thereafter. The value of rubber 
exports decreased by 29.8% between 1957 and 1968, while that of timber exports increased 
by 961.9% over the same period.
321
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As a consequence, the primary sector remained the main source of employment in the 
domestic economy (Figure 7). Its share was largest in Sarawak, where it employed 82.2% of 
the working population; the tertiary sector employed 12.1% and the secondary sector 5.7%. 
Corresponding figures were respectively 80.8%, 12.7% and 6.5% for Sabah, and 61.9%, 
28.0% and 10.2% for the Federation of Malaya. When comparing the statistics with those 
from ten years before, two observations can be made. First, the share of the secondary sector 
had grown in every territory. Second, employment in the tertiary sector showed a sharp 
decline on Borneo. The precise reason for this is unclear, but it may be connected to the 
smaller size of the working population in 1960. Presumably, women providing services within 
the confines of their own household were previously considered to be employed in the tertiary 
sector.
322
 Even though the primary sector was the largest source of employment, the tertiary 
sector contributed most to GDP throughout the period under review (Figure 8). 
 
323
 
 Source: See note 323. 
 
Malay Malaysians 
As became clear above, those members of the Malay Malaysian elite playing a prominent role 
in the administration in the years leading up to independence managed to retain their position 
during the period under review. Therefore, one would not expect policies regulating 
entrepreneurship to challenge the economic status quo in any radical manner. That being said, 
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independence undoubtedly gave policymakers more leeway to promote Malay Malaysians 
business interests because there was no longer a need for economic policies to be subservient 
to metropolitan interests. Moreover, the gradual Malayanization of the bureaucracy during the 
period 1957-1965, involving the replacement of expatriates by Malays,
324
 diminished the 
chance of such policies being opposed in government circles. 
 
325
 
 Source: Based on World Bank: WDI. 
 
Policies aimed at the development of Malay Malaysian entrepreneurship, then, were 
broader in scope than before independence. In the field of land policies this manifested itself 
in the maintenance of Malay reservations and customary land without the condition that part 
of this land should be planted with paddy.
326
 In addition, the Federal Land Development 
Authority (FELDA), a government agency established in 1956, allocated land to landless 
peasants for the cultivation of cash crops.
327
 Even though FELDA catered to all landless 
peasants, notwithstanding ethnic origin,
328
 both Drabble, and Gomez and Jomo argue that its 
activities mainly benefitted Malays.
329
 They do, however, not specify whether this can be 
attributed to conscious policy or the larger demand among members of this group. After all, 
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Malay Malaysians constituted the majority of rural poor.
330
 During the period under review 
21,422 families or approximately 139,243 persons
331
 received land covering a total of 124,854 
hectares.
332
 While the number of resettled persons may seem impressive at first glance, 
demand clearly outstripped supply.
333
 
Up until 1960 all FELDA holdings were planted with rubber, but in the following year 
it also started to initiate palm oil schemes. By the end of 1970, 59,861 hectares were under 
rubber and 64,966 hectares under oil palms.
334
 In this way, smallholders were able to diversify 
into the cultivation of oil palms; FELDA schemes accounted for 25.1% of oil palm acreage in 
1970.
335
 Previously the industry had been controlled by foreign-owned estates, because 
smallholders could not meet the capital requirements for the production of palm oil.
336
 This 
was not the only problem associated with cultivation on smallholdings; profitability was 
strongly dependent upon careful harvesting, rapid processing and the full utilization of mills. 
Therefore, settlers first received training on a communal lot before being allocated an 
individual holding of four hectares. The same method was deployed in rubber schemes from 
1962 onwards.
337
  
The average monthly income of settlers lay between 300 and 350 Malaysian dollars, 
which was significantly higher than the $50 to $65 they could earn as rural labourers. This 
income could, however, only be attained once the crop reached maturity,
338
 that is after 
approximately seven years in the case of rubber and three years in the case of oil palms.
339
 
Prior to this they had to rely on a subsistence allowance of up to $70 depending on the 
number of days worked. The allowance did not concern a gift, but a loan which had to be 
repaid within fifteen years after the first harvest against an interest of 6.25%. In addition, 
settlers had to cover the costs associated with the building of their house and the development 
of their holding. Nonetheless, Bahrin and Lee argue that ‘[t]here is no do doubt that FELDA’s 
land development and settlement activities have improved the economic status of its 
settlers.’340 On the long term this may well have been true as Drabble argues that the majority 
of settlers were able to repay their loans and subsequently acquire motor vehicles and 
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electronic equipment for their own consumption.
341
 It is doubtable whether they would have 
been able to do this to a similar extent in their capacity as rural labourers. 
 
 
   Source: Derived from White, British business, 141. 
 
Government efforts to stimulate the cultivation of cash crops among rural Malays were 
not limited to the activities of FELDA. As was mentioned above, the Rubber Replanting 
Scheme introduced during the preceding period remained in force until 30 June 1962.
342
 This 
was followed by a second scheme which supplied 750 Malaysian dollars to smallholders 
owning more than five acres for every acre they were planning to replant, and $800 to those 
owning less land.
343
 Smallholders wanting to plant rubber on land previously used for other 
purposes were entitled to $400 per acre;
344
 no provisions were made for grants to estates.
345
 
As a result, the number of smallholdings under high-yielding trees increased from 50% of the 
total in 1965
346
 to 63% five years later.
347
 The corresponding figures for estates were 78%
348
 
and 84%.
349
 Moreover, while smallholdings comprised 45.9% of Malayan rubber acreage in 
1957, this had increased to 62.5% by the end of the period (Figure 9). Since high-yielding 
trees produced three to four times more rubber per acre than old ones, replanting bolstered 
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potential profitability,
350
 although this was somewhat weakened by a 40% fall in international 
rubber prices between 1957 and 1970
351
 caused by increased competition from synthetic 
rubber.
352
 
With self-sufficiency in food requirements still out of sight, government similarly 
continued to stimulate rice production both by improving yield per acre and ensuring a steady 
income to those entrepreneurs growing paddy. For the purpose of achieving the former, 
irrigation works were carried out
353
 and, under the First Malaysia Plan, a Padi Fertiliser 
Subsidy Scheme was introduced which allowed farmers to buy fertilisers for 70% of the 
market price.
354
 A steady income was to be ensured through a guaranteed minimum price for 
paddy, similar to the Padi Purchasing Scheme introduced in the Borneo territories during the 
preceding period,
355
 and the establishment of the Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority 
(FAMA).  Under the auspices of FAMA the trade in rice was regulated by licensing 
middlemen and demanding immediate cash payments in exchange for produce. An official 
year book for Malaysia tells us that this caused growers to obtain a better price for paddy, but 
there are no statistics available to confirm this.
356
 Two other policy measures deserve to be 
mentioned here: the enactment of the Padi Cultivators Act in 1967 and the establishment of an 
Agricultural Development Bank two years later.
357
 The former strengthened the position of 
tenants because it required land lords to enter a tenancy agreement for a minimum of three 
seasons and set restrictions on the amount of rent that should be paid.
358
 The Agricultural 
Development Bank constituted a source of agricultural credit, thus providing an alternative to 
the cooperatives.
359
  
 As for the success of these policies, the area under wet paddy grew from 794,120 acres 
in 1962-1963 to 963,890 acres in 1967-1968, while the area under dry paddy decreased 
slightly from 44,450 acres to 43,850 acres.
360
 It should be noted that the growth of acreage 
can be mainly attributed to the fact that every acre of double cropped land represented two 
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acres in Malaysian statistics;
361
 this area increased from 20,900 acres at the end of 1960
362
 to 
104,450 acres during the 1966-1967 season.
363
 Consequently, production of paddy grew from 
827,125 tons in 1962-1963 to 1,013,365 tons five year later. At the same time, sensitivity to 
the forces of nature remained with production only comprising 711, 308 tons in 1963-1964.
364
 
This is also reflected by the fact that the value of Malayan rice imports failed to display a 
declining trend (Figure 10). 
 
365
 
 Source: See note 365. 
 
 Policies to stimulate the development of Malay Malaysian entrepreneurship were not 
limited to the agricultural sector. The Road Traffic Ordinance of 1958 required all new 
transport licenses to be issued to Malays until they had gained a share of the industry that was 
equivalent to their share of the population in a state. Ten years later this target was met in six 
states in case of the taxi industry, but only eighteen percent of commercial buses and six 
percent of trucks were owned by Malay Malaysians. In 1965 a quota was set to issue 50% of 
all timber licenses to Malay entrepreneurs thus further strengthening their position in this 
industry; a year earlier they already held licenses for nearly half of peninsular timber acreage. 
Even though no such quotas were set in the construction sector, Malay contractors tended to 
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Figure 10: Value of Malayan rice imports, 1958-1967   
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be given responsibility over public projects as long as their price was not more than ten 
percent higher than that of non-indigenes.
366
  
In November 1969 a state-owned enterprise called Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS) 
or National Corporation was established for the purpose of promoting ‘increased participation 
of the indigenous community in commerce and industry, either through subsidiary companies 
or jointly with other organisations.’367 During 1970 PERNAS was occupied with the trade in 
building materials and the export of sawn timber. In addition, it established a subsidiary 
company dealing in insurances and bought land on Malay reservations for mining purposes. 
Government also set up the Exploitation of Minerals in Malay Reservation Loan Fund and 
Trust Account to give financial support to those Malays willing to enter the mining industry. 
By the end of 1970 two Malay mining companies had received loans totalling 400,000 
Malaysian dollars to open gravel pump tin mines. One of PERNAS’ minority shareholders 
was Bank Bumiputra,
368
 a government-supported private bank ‘intended primarily to inject 
capital into business ventures by Malay entrepreneurs.’369 
 Prior to March 1966 RIDA was the main agency giving support to Malay Malaysian 
entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector. The activities of RIDA were largely confined to 
rural areas where it provided loans to enterprises active in the primary, secondary and tertiary 
sectors of the economy and promoted the development of small-scale manufacturing. For this 
purpose, it carried out market research, gave technical advice and training, and functioned as a 
purchasing and selling association for individual producers. According to a 1961 official year 
book RIDA was also planning to establish a number of manufacturing enterprises which 
would stay under its control for a number of years before being brought under Malay 
ownership, but it is unclear whether these plans have ever come to fruition.
370
 
  In 1966 RIDA was reconstituted as Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) or Indigenous 
People’s Trust Council. MARA sought to enhance the position of bumiputra entrepreneurs in 
five ways. First, it organised education program ranging from the vocational level to the 
academic level and awarded scholarships to enable people to continue their study abroad; by 
the end of 1970, 3,000 students were enrolled in the MARA Institute of Technology, an 
institution for higher education. Second, it lent money to enterprises taking more risk and 
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demanding lower interest rates than commercial banks.
371
 Its lending policy contrasted with 
that of RIDA in the sense that business ventures in agriculture and fisheries were no longer 
eligible for loans.
372
 Third, entrepreneurs could address MARA for professional advice on 
matters relating to accounting, business management, engineering, marketing and product 
design. Fourth, commercial buildings such as shophouses and factories, and raw materials 
could be obtained under favourable conditions.
373
 Fifth, MARA made investments in 
commercial ventures subsequently selling shares to individual investors and ran a unit trust 
fund.
374
 Another organisation seeking to increase Malay share ownership was Syarikat 
Permodalan Kebangsaan (SPK).
375
 
 
Table 10: Ownership of equity capital of incorporated companies by 
ethnicity and industry in Malaya, 1970 
 Chinese Foreigners Indians Malays 
Agriculture, 
forestry & 
fisheries 
22.4% 
 
75.3% 0.1% 0.9% 
Mining & 
quarrying 
16.8% 72.4% 0.4% 0.7% 
Construction 52.8% 24.1% 0.8% 2.2% 
Manufacturing 22.0% 59.6% 0.7% 2.5% 
Banking & 
insurance 
24.3% 52.2% 0.6% 3.3% 
Commerce 30.4% 63.5% 0.7% 0.8% 
Transport & 
communications 
43.4% 12.0% 2.3% 13.3% 
Others 37.8% 31.4% 2.3% 2.3% 
Total 22.5% 60.7% 1.0% 1.9% 
Source: Based on Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia’s political economy, 20. 
 
 Despite these efforts Malay Malaysians still owned only 1.9% of the equity capital in 
limited companies in Malaya by 1970, significantly less than both Chinese and foreign 
investors (Table 10). It was only in transport & communications that Malays constituted the 
second largest group of investors. This may be attributed to the activities of MARA which 
established bus services throughout the country, selling shares of these companies to 
bumiputras as soon as they proved economically viable.
376
 Loans supplied by MARA, 
amounting to 11.3 million Malayan dollars between 1965 and 1968,
377
 were mainly used for 
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investments in the tertiary sector, rather than manufacturing. There was, however, a tendency 
for individual loans to be used for bigger projects as time went by; initially construction, retail 
trade and taxis were the most important destinations, later on the portfolio included logging, 
hotels and filling stations.
378
 
 
Other indigenous Malaysians 
Although a 1970 official year book for Malaysia tells us that it was ‘the policy of the 
Government since Independence to improve the social and economic conditions of the 
Bumiputras in every aspect,’379 in practice policies mainly targeted Malay Malaysians living 
in the peninsula. The activities of organizations set up to strengthen bumiputra business 
interests such as MARA and SPK were limited to Malaya and the same applied to FELDA 
schemes. This may be partly attributed to the fact that the state governments of Sabah and 
Sarawak, rather than the federal government, were responsible for the implementation of 
development policies.
380
 At the same time, the ethnic factor played a role as well. The non-
Muslim majority of East Malaysia’s indigenous population may have been regarded 
bumiputras,
381
 but the interests of these inland people clearly differed from those of the 
Malays and Melanaus living on the coast. The former traditionally practised swidden 
agriculture, while the latter relied on sedentary cultivation.
382
 
 This also caused non-Muslim indigenous dominance of Bornean politics to be viewed 
with suspicion by the rulers in Kuala Lumpur. In Sabah Chief Minister Donald Stephens, a 
prominent Dusun leader who had played a key role in state politics prior to independence, was 
forced out of office in 1966. He was replaced by Tun Mustapha, a Muslim of mixed Moro-
Bajau origin. In the same year, Stephan Kalong Ningkan, the Iban Chief Minister of Sarawak, 
was ousted and replaced by Tawi Sli, another Iban, who proved more willing to pursue 
policies supported by the Alliance. Four years later a Melanau Muslim, Abdul Rahman 
Ya’kub, became Chief Minister.383  
Possibilities to strengthen the position of other indigenous Malaysian entrepreneurs 
were further inhibited by the slow pace of Borneanization of the bureaucracy. In 1960 194 of 
the 254 posts in the Sarawak civil service were held by expatriates and only 43 by locals with 
the remaining posts being vacant; half of the Borneans in the civil service was of Chinese 
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descent.
384
 During Ningkan’s administration, colonial officials continued to play a dominant 
role in policy-making.
385
 From the second half of the 1960s bureaucrats from the peninsula 
were on the increase in both Sabah and Sarawak.
386
 Kaur concludes that the ‘general 
population’ was largely deprived from the ‘[m]anagement of these economies’.387 
 As a consequence, policies regulating other indigenous Malaysian entrepreneurs were 
not only less extensive than those regulating Malay Malaysian entrepreneurs, but land policies 
sometimes even worked against indigenous interests. The new land code adopted in Sarawak 
in 1958 acknowledged indigenes’ special rights to land through the preservation of native 
areas but prohibited the creation of new customary rights in the interior without a permit. 
Prior to 1958 it had been possible to obtain such rights over land by felling jungle and 
bringing it into productive use.
388
 In addition, a category of reserved land was created that 
included forest reserves and sanctuaries. Under the land code, government was allowed to 
alienate all types of land for the creation of reserved land, including that previously held 
under indigenes ownership.
389
 These measures strongly restricted the possibilities to practice 
swidden agriculture. According to Porritt the creation of Forest Reserves up to 1963 alone had 
decreased the land available for shifting cultivation by a quarter,
390
 although the low density 
of officials in the interior made it relatively easy for indigenes to occupy land illegally.
391
 
 In Sabah land legislation remained unchanged,
392
 but here the authorities also sought 
to curtail shifting cultivation in order to prevent deforestation. It remains a matter of 
discussion whether this practice caused deforestation. Kaur argues along with several other 
studies that this was not the case,
393
 while Cleary and Eaton write that there ‘can be little 
doubt that shifting cultivation has contributed to the problem of deforestation and its attendant 
soil and hydrological consequences on Borneo.’394 It was, however, not more wasteful than 
logging, but the fact of the matter is that the timber industry played a considerably more 
important role in filling government coffers and boosting external trade.
395
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 Since the authorities were conscious that indigenes could only be induced to change 
their way of living when offered a suitable alternative, they sought to promote settled 
agriculture through various schemes. In 1960 the Department of Agriculture in Sarawak 
resettled 160 indigenous families on land suitable for the cultivation of rubber and wet paddy 
and provided them with long-term loans.
396
 A more systematic approach was adopted four 
years later with the introduction of Rubber Planting Scheme B. As part of this scheme, settlers 
were allocated a ten acre-holding of which eight acres were planted with high-yielding rubber 
trees, while the remainder included a house and space to cultivate fruit and vegetables.
397
 By 
1970, 1,177 families had received land covering a total 13,700 acres. As was the case in 
FELDA schemes, settlers had to repay the subsistence allowance they were eligible to before 
the crop reached maturity
398
 and the costs for the development of their holding.
399
 In Sabah 
such a systematic approach towards land development was not adopted until the 1970s. 
Consequently, schemes showed a larger diversity in terms of the type of crop planted, ranging 
from rubber and wet paddy to oil palms and coconuts, and the size of holdings with some 
measuring five acres and others thirteen acres.
400
 
 Both Kaur and Cleary and Eaton convincingly argue that these endeavours have been a 
‘mixed success’.401 A large number of settlers in Sarawak were faced with a problem to repay 
their loan to the Sarawak Development Finance Corporation (SDFC).
402
 SDFC was 
established by the colonial authorities in 1958 to provide credit for agricultural 
undertakings
403
 and took over the responsibility for Rubber Planting Scheme B from the 
Department of Agriculture in 1968. Payment problems were partly caused by a decline in 
rubber prices, but a lack of commitment among settlers to work their land played a role as 
well.
404
  
Different from Malaya where the demand for holdings on settlement schemes 
outstripped supply,
405
 indigenous Malaysians on Borneo remained reluctant to change from 
swidden agriculture to sedentary cultivation. The fact that landlessness was practically 
unknown in East Malaysia
406
 and schemes were often located hundreds kilometres away from 
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settlers’ area of origin was not conducive to their success either.407 The latter did not apply to 
SDFC schemes in Sarawak since indigenes were allocated holdings on land that they formerly 
held under customary tenure.
408
 Moreover, even though settled agriculture potentially 
produced higher yields, the low population density and scarcity of high quality soil 
legitimized shifting cultivation.
409
 
 Resettlement was not only utilized to curb swidden agriculture, it also supported 
government efforts to stimulate the production of cash crops and paddy. In addition, a number 
of other methods were deployed. The Rubber Planting Scheme introduced in Sarawak in 1956 
continued to be in effect during the 1960s.
410
 Under this scheme smallholders were supplied 
with high-yielding planting material
411
 and received a subsidy of 400 Malaysian dollars for 
every acre newly planted and $600 for replantings.
412
 Initially, it was projected to plant 
10,000 acres of land with high-yielding trees over a five-year period, but this target had 
already been met within three years;
413
 by the end of 1967 the area covered 134,354 acres.
414
  
Since participation in the Rubber Planting Scheme demanded a ‘high standard of 
husbandry’ and close supervision from agricultural officers, it was not available to 
entrepreneurs living in remote areas or lacking sophistication in agricultural methods. 
Therefore, government introduced an Assisted Rubber Planting Scheme in 1960 enabling 
these agriculturalists to follow a course on various aspects of rubber production in one of the 
processing centres spread throughout the state before receiving enough high-yielding planting 
material and fertilisers, free of charge, to plant one acre. If the first year of cultivation proved 
successful they were entitled to material for another two acres.
415
 The acreage under high-
yielding rubber in Sarawak grew from 16.9% of total rubber area in 1960 to 41.1% seven 
years later
416
 with the majority being owned by Ibans. According to Cramb this expansion can 
be largely attributed to government assistance as declining rubber prices otherwise would not 
have allowed planting.
417
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   Source: Derived from Department of Statistics, Sabah, 1968, 66. 
 
Table 11: Ownership of agricultural holdings in Sabah by ethnicity, 1961 
 Number of holdings Area (acres) 
Bajaus 5,487 (12.8%) 33,756 (5.5%) 
Chinese 7,939 (18.5%) 170,346 (27.9%) 
Kadazans 20,312 (47.2%) 167,129 (27.4%) 
Malays 3,057 (7.1%) 26,470 (4.4%) 
Muruts 1,236 (2.9%) 10,088 (1.7%) 
Others 4,917 (11.4%) 43,491 (7.1%) 
Non – household holdings 26 (0.1%) 158,556 (26.0%) 
Total 42,974 (100%) 609,836 (100%) 
Source: Based on Department of Statistics, Sabah, 1968, 62. 
 
In Sabah the area under high-yielding rubber grew from 41% of rubber acreage in 
1961 to 60% in 1968. Corresponding figures were 32% and 48% for estates and 47% and 67% 
for smallholdings.
418
 It is surprising that there was a higher incidence of high-yielding rubber 
in Sabah than in Sarawak, because growers received lower subsidies: $120 for new plantings 
and $550 for replantings.
419
 Over the same period, the share of smallholdings in total Sabahan 
rubber acreage increased from 61% to 68% (Figure 11). Even though it is unclear to what 
extent this benefited other indigenous Malaysian entrepreneurs (including Bajaus, Kadazans 
and Muruts), the fact that they owned 62.9% of agricultural holdings and 34.6% of acreage in 
1961 does suggest that they also had a considerable stake in the rubber industry (Table 11). 
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 The production of wet paddy was stimulated in a variety of ways. To begin with, the 
authorities continued to buy paddy from cultivators against a guaranteed price;
420
 in Sarawak 
government bought 14,042 tons in the period 1957-1962
421
 for a price of 13.50 Malaysian 
dollars per picul.
422
 In 1959 this was supplemented by the Assistance to Padi Planters Scheme 
in the former white sultanate
423
 and the Assistance to Wet-Padi Planters Scheme in Sabah. 
The latter entailed the extension of irrigation works by the Public Works Department,
424
 while 
the former involved the provision of technical advice, materials and small cash subsidies to 
farmers. In this way they could develop wet paddy areas in a cooperative fashion.
425
 In 
addition, the use of buffaloes to work the land was promoted by giving farmers training on the 
use of these animals and subsidizing their purchase.
426
 In Sabah fertilizers were similarly 
subsidized.
427
 According to Solhee, paddy schemes in Sarawak initially mainly benefited the 
non-Muslim indigenous people living in the interior. It was only after Ningkan was forced to 
leave office in 1966 that more attention was paid to the lowland areas where Malays and 
Melanaus lived. This can be explained by the fact that his successor, Tawi Sli, brought 
policies closer in line with those demanded by the federal government. Around this time the 
government also assumed a larger role in the extension of irrigation projects with the 
establishment of a Drainage and Irrigation Department.
428
  
Overall, the various paddy schemes proved a mixed success, just like the settlement 
schemes. In Sabah the area under wet paddy grew from 62,700 acres in 1963 to 74,555 acres 
five years later, while production increased from 57,600 tons to 80,427 tons over the same 
period.
429
 In Sarawak the results were less impressive: the area under wet paddy showed a 
small growth from 99,821 acres in 1960-1961 to 108,631 acres in 1966-1967, but production 
fell from 22,658,344 gantangs to 22,576,223 gantangs
430
. Planted area and production both 
fluctuated from year to year; in 1964-1965 26,015,394 gantangs were harvested from 118,477 
acres.
431
 Correspondingly both the value and the size of Bornean rice imports failed to show a 
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declining trajectory (Figures 12 and 13). In most cases, paddy remained a subsistence crop 
with only 36% of the rice-growers in Sarawak producing enough to feed their own family.
432
 
 
433
 
 Source: See note 433. 
 
434
 
 Source: See note 434. 
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Figure 12: Value of Bornean rice imports, 1957-1968 
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Even though non-Muslim indigenous interests played a dominant role in state politics 
until the second half of the 1960s, this did not prevent the government of Sarawak from 
pursuing policies supporting Muslim Melanaus. In October 1957 the export duty on sago flour 
was abolished in order to ensure higher prices for producers.
435
 To give a further impulse to 
the industry the manufacture of fully refined sago flour was declared a pioneer industry in 
1961. This enabled entrepreneurs
 ‘in each of any five years during a period of eight years 
commencing on production day to set off against income from the manufacture of the relevant 
product a sum equivalent to one-fifth of the permitted capital expenditure.’436 These 
measures, however, were practically to no avail. Exports of sago flour increased from 19,683 
tons in 1960 to 57,515 tons four years later and 35,973 tons in 1968, but with prices on the 
decline
437
 this was a sign of growers lacking alternative opportunities rather than industrial 
vitality.
438
 Increasingly, women became responsible for the working of sago, while men 
sought wage employment in the timber industry.
439
 The decline of the sago industry is 
manifested by a decrease in planted area from 150,000 acres in 1953
440
 to 90,000 acres in 
1965.
441
 
 Efforts to promote indigenous Malaysian entrepreneurship were not limited to 
agriculture. In Sarawak the Agricultural Department continued to provide support to those 
planning to operate freshwater fish farms or already operating one.
442
 In addition, the SDFC 
provided loans to entrepreneurs engaged in agriculture as well as fisheries, the timber 
industry, agricultural processing and manufacturing as long as these utilized a considerable 
amount of locally sourced raw materials.
443
 Nevertheless, there is no evidence of any 
indigenous entrepreneurial activity in manufacturing, while their role in the timber industry 
was negligible.
444
 In Sabah, by contrast, they were able to extend their interest to logging; in 
1963 there were four indigenous licensees. Three of these concerned companies under 
indigenous ownership, while the fourth was a cooperative ‘open to all Natives.’445 
 
 
                                                          
435
 Colonial Office, Sarawak: annual report, 1958 (Kuching 1959) 45. 
436
 CO, Sarawak: 1962, 128 and 136. 
437
 Department of Statistics, Sarawak, 1968, 82. 
438
 CO, Sarawak: 1960, 57-58. 
439
 CO, Sarawak: 1961, 55. 
440
 CO, Economic survey, 140-141. 
441
 FDoI, Malaysia: 1965, 368. 
442
 CO, Sarawak: 1960, 66-67; CO, Sarawak: 1962, 99-101. 
443
 CO, Sarawak: 1961, 78. 
444
 Porritt, Colonial rule in Sarawak, 226. 
445
 Sabah, Sabah: 1963, 68. 
65 
 
Chinese Malaysians 
More than ever before, Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurs in the post-independence period 
were confronted with a government seeking to promote Malay Malaysian business interests. 
In the past, efforts had been limited to sectors in which Malays already played a dominant 
role, but now they touched upon such Chinese bulwarks as transport and construction. That 
being said, the strong political representation of the Chinese business community, or more 
specifically the close ties of some of its members to Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
prevented affirmative action in commerce and manufacturing. It is telling that the UMNO 
Minister for Agriculture and Co-operative, Abdul Aziz Rashak, was forced to leave his office 
in 1963, because his ‘advocacy of co-operatives in the kampung cut across the interests of 
Chinese rice and rubber traders.’446 These same political connections enabled a number of 
entrepreneurs, including H. S. Lee, to obtain a banking license from the government, while 
Lim Goh Tong was permitted to open a casino.
447
 
 Another Chinese Malaysian entrepreneur, Robert Kuok, secured pioneer status for his 
manufacturing ventures in sugar and flour production,
448
 thus exempting him from paying 
income tax for a period of two to five years.
449
 Kuok’s experience was, however, more the 
exception than the rule with most pioneer certificates being awarded to foreign-owned 
companies. According to White ‘the federal government tended to favour foreign firms in 
preference to local Chinese capitalists for fear of the latter further dominating the Malaysian 
economy at the expense of the bumiputera.’450 Golay et al. similarly write that Malay leaders 
had an interest in ‘maintaining a large Western stake in the economy’, but convincingly add 
that this manifested itself ‘in the strict impartiality observed in policies affecting foreign 
investment vis-à-vis investment by nationals.’451 Since foreign investors had more capital at 
their disposal they stood a better chance of meeting the technological requirements for pioneer 
status. For the most part, Chinese involvement in Malayan manufacturing remained limited to 
small-scale food, wood and plastic processing.
452
 
 On Borneo Chinese Malaysians were able to play a comparatively larger role in the 
manufacturing sector because the small size of the Bornean market, high labour costs and 
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weak infrastructure made this an unattractive destination for foreign investments.
453
 A 1960 
annual report for Sarawak tells us that the majority of industrial investments were of local 
origin. Although the report does not specify on the ethnicity of investors one may safely 
assume that they mainly concerned Chinese Malaysians, since investments were financed 
with profits from the rubber, pepper and timber industry; Chinese entrepreneurs played a 
dominant role in the latter two.
454
 According to Porritt the majority of the seven factories 
which had been granted pioneer status in Sarawak by the end of 1962 were Chinese-owned.
455
 
They were said to own 94% of the 5,718 commercial facilities in the state six years later. This 
figure includes enterprises in both the secondary and tertiary sector of the economy.
456
 
 Pioneer status was not the only policy measure that benefitted Chinese entrepreneurs 
in the manufacturing sector of Sarawak. In addition, government participated in the 
development of factory sites either directly or through the SDFC. In the tertiary sector, the 
services of SDFC came to support exporters of pepper, who received loans worth 1,281,496 
Malaysian dollars in 1960
457
 and $672,600 in 1961. These concerned advances made ‘in 
connection with bulk storage of pepper prior to export.’458 Since a considerable portion of 
world pepper production originated in Sarawak, a third in 1957,
459
 manipulating supply 
through the maintenance of a stockpile could lead to a considerable increase of the world 
market price and thus a higher reward for those involved in the pepper industry. In practice, 
however, exports of white pepper rose from 3,393 tons in 1960 to 10,826 tons eight years 
later. This triggered an increase in export earnings from little over fifteen million Malaysian 
dollars to $19.1 million, but a fall in the average price per ton from $4,474 to $1,763. Black 
pepper exports increased from 705 tons to 11,978 tons over the same period, leading the value 
of exports to rise from $2 million to $15.6 million, but the average price per ton to be reduced 
by 50%.
460
 
 The authorities in Sarawak remained rather lenient towards Chinese Malaysians in 
terms of land policies. In 1960 4,655 acres of land that was formerly held by indigenes under 
native customary rights was made available to Chinese smallholders. The same applied to 525 
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acres of land in a forest reserve.
461
 Two years later the area constituting mixed zone land was 
expanded by another 50,000 acres. In the same year the Mining (Amendment) Ordinance was 
adopted which enabled miners to obtain mining rights for minerals below the ground without 
also being required to possess rights over the surface. Moreover, it was now possible to 
acquire an exclusive prospecting license without first investigating whether indigenes 
possessed any customary rights over an area.
462
 
 As was mentioned above, the buffer stock which was established in 1956 as part of the 
International Tin Agreement came to support Chinese tin miners who operated less efficiently 
than their European counterparts.
463
 They were similarly supported by Malayan land policies 
which tended to favour Chinese ownership of land on Malay reservations over foreign 
ownership, thus giving them access to a fresh supply of rich deposits. Consequently, as of 
1966, the Chinese regained their leading position in Malayan tin production which they had 
lost in 1929. The fact that gravel pumping continued to be the method of choice for the 
overwhelming majority of Chinese mining concerns, then, did not hurt their interests.
464
 
 Up until the middle of the 1950s the timber industry in Sabah was largely controlled 
by four foreign long-term concessionaires, but this began to change during the period under 
review. In 1956 the colonial government was forced to further liberalize the industry after it 
had been sued by a number of wealthy Chinese businessmen. At the dawn of independence a 
large number of small Chinese firms who operated under annual licenses had managed to 
obtain a considerable share of the industry.
465
 In the period that followed the strong 
representation of the Chinese business community in Sabahan politics ensured that many of 
the annual licenses were converted into long-term special licenses. Moreover, under 
Mustapha’s chief ministership entrepreneurs were allocated large strips of land in return for 
electoral support, thus enabling their companies to gain market share. In Sarawak, Chinese 
Malaysians had been dominating the timber industry from the outset, but there political 
connections similarly began to play an important role in ensuring their position after 
independence.
466
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Indian Malaysians 
The lack of affirmative action programs for Malays in commerce did not only benefit Chinese 
Malaysian entrepreneurs but also Indian Malaysians operating in this sector.
467
 Moreover, 
these predominantly urban-based groups were aided by the fact that urban projects constituted 
half of public expenditure under the First and Second Malaya Plans (1955-1965) and the First 
Malaysia Plan (1966-1970), while urban services ranked first among private investments.
468
 
That being said, Indian Malaysian entrepreneurs were less successful in turning the post-
independence environment to their advantage than their Chinese counterparts. Harper argues 
that ‘the corporate stake of the Indian community had remained static between independence 
and the conclusion of the NEP.’469 Chettiar moneylenders, in particular, saw their market 
share gradually being eroded due to government assistance to rural Malay Malaysians. 
Consequently a large number of them returned to India, while others entered the urban 
construction sector.
470
 In 1968 approximately half of Indian Malaysians living on the 
peninsula was engaged in plantation work,
471
 down from three-fifths in 1957;
472
 37.8% was 
employed in commerce, manufacturing, mining and services.
473
 No information is given 
regarding the distribution between these sectors, but in 1957 the services sector was the most 
important source of employment, followed by commerce, manufacturing and mining.
474
  
In an effort to support Indian Malaysian plantation labourers the MIC established the 
National Land Finance Cooperative Society (NLFCS) on 14 May 1960 which was to acquire 
fragmented estates using the combined resources of workers; these could buy a share in the 
cooperative for 100 Malayan dollars. The NLFCS proved popular from the start with an initial 
membership of 15,000 and an accumulated capital of $1.7 million. Three years later it had 
29,000 members and capital worth $7.6 million thus making it the largest cooperative in 
Malaysia. This enabled the NLFCS to buy its first estate within a month after its 
establishment and regularly pay annual dividends around ten percent throughout the 1960s.
475
 
It was, however, in no position to compete with a state-owned enterprise such as PERNAS 
which had a paid-up capital of $116 million at its disposal in 1969.
476
  
                                                          
467White, ‘Beginnings of crony capitalism’, 401.  
468
 Tajuddin, Malaysia in the world economy, 148. 
469
 Harper, Making of Malaya, 370. 
470
 Evers, ‘Chettiar moneylenders’, 215. 
471
 Tajuddin, Malaysia in the world economy, 148. 
472
 Golay et al., Economic nationalism in Southeast Asia, 350. 
473
 Tajuddin, Malaysia in the world economy, 148. 
474
 Golay et al., Economic nationalism in Southeast Asia, 351. 
475
 E. T. Gomez, Political business: corporate involvement of Malaysian political parties (Townsville, 
Queensland 1994) 248-249. 
476
 Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia’s political economy, 32. 
69 
 
Conclusion 
 
My analysis of the competitive position of Malay Malaysian, other indigenous Malaysian, 
Chinese Malaysian and Indian Malaysian entrepreneurs during the fifty-year period preceding 
the New Economic Policy provides an answer to my original research question, i.e. to what 
extent did changes in the conditions for the development of entrepreneurship of varying ethnic 
origin during the period 1920-1970 anticipate the New Economic Policy? I argue that, 
although the favourable conditions facing Malay Malaysian entrepreneurs under the NEP 
were historically unprecedented, positive discrimination of Malays in government policies has 
deep historical roots. Initially such policies were fairly narrow in scope, gradually broadening 
as time went by. By the second half of the 1960s the policy climate already portrayed many of 
the features that would come to characterize the NEP. 
 Between 1920 and the Allied surrender to Japanese forces in 1942, positive 
discrimination mainly entailed preferential access to land through customary tenure and 
Malay reservations on the peninsula, indigenous areas in Sarawak and indigenous customary 
rights in BNB. There were, however, conditions associated with the use of this land: to 
varying degrees, peasants were required to plant their holding with paddy instead of cash 
crops. The distribution of high-yielding paddy seeds and extension of irrigation works were 
similarly intended to increase domestic rice production. Following the Pacific War, colonial 
authorities also began to promote the cultivation of rubber among Malay Malaysians. For this 
purpose, factories were established for the processing of smallholder rubber and the planting 
of high-yielding rubber varieties was subsidized. In addition, RIDA supplied loans to rural 
Malays and boats to fishermen.  
It was only after the end of British colonial rule that the Alliance government 
embarked on affirmative action beyond the confines of agriculture and fishing. Quotas were 
set to encourage Malay participation in the timber and transport industries, Malay 
construction companies were preferred in government projects, and such public enterprises as 
SPK and MARA began acquiring equity on behalf of this group. These enterprises would 
subsequently come to play an important role under the NEP. Entrepreneurs engaged in 
manufacturing could gain support from MARA for subsidized raw materials and business 
premises, technical advice and loans; a separate loan fund was established for Malay 
Malaysian tin mining companies. Meanwhile, government efforts in agriculture were 
intensified with paddy growers benefitting from subsidized fertilisers, a guaranteed price for 
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paddy and marketing schemes. This period also saw the development of settlement schemes 
to reduce rural landlessness. 
 Since colonial law did not differentiate between Malays and other indigenes, the non-
Malay indigenous Malaysians living on Borneo were similarly confronted with a favourable 
policy climate. In fact, native areas in Sarawak and native customary rights in BNB mainly 
benefited this group, given their numerical dominance. That being said, lower expenditure on 
rural development caused policies in their support to be considerably more limited than those 
accruing to peninsular Malays. This changed when the Borneo territories came under direct 
control of the British Colonial Office after the Japanese occupation. In Sarawak in particular, 
the colonial authorities began to promote rural development. In 1946 a guaranteed price for 
paddy was introduced, more than ten years before its introduction in Malaya. In addition, the 
planting of high-yielding rubber was subsidized and the Agricultural Department supplied 
pepper shoots and sweet water fish to interested entrepreneurs. In BNB, by contrast, a Padi 
Purchasing Scheme was the only policy measure of note. During the 1960s this was 
supplemented by settlement schemes and schemes subsidizing high-yielding rubber and 
paddy, fertilizers and buffaloes. Moreover, indigenes in Sabah were allocated a number of 
logging licenses. 
Despite the Alliance government claiming to promote bumiputra, rather than Malay, 
business interests MARA, PERNAS and SPK were not active on Borneo. As a consequence, 
affirmative action in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy was absent. The SFDC 
did participate in the development of factory sites and supplied loans, but had no preference 
regarding the ethnicity of those gaining support. As Chinese Malaysians had a controlling 
stake in the manufacturing sector of Sarawak, it is most probable that they were the main 
beneficiaries of this scheme. Only other indigenous Malaysian entrepreneurs in Sarawak, 
then, could on one point in time (1945-1957) count upon government support that was 
roughly similar to the support received by Malay entrepreneurs in Malaya. Support in the 
post-independence period was not only more limited, the curtailing of swidden agriculture 
clearly worked against the interests of those indigenes deploying this cultivation method; this 
mainly concerned non-Muslim Dayaks. The resettlement of indigenes did not prove a viable 
alternative. 
This similarly applied to Chinese Malaysian squatters who were forced to resettle to 
New Villages during the Malayan Emergency. Their resettlement led the domestic production 
of vegetables and pork to be drastically reduced. Although Chinese Malaysians lacked a 
special position in Malaysian land laws, Bornean authorities proved rather lenient towards this 
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group on various occasions. In order to satisfy the demand for foreign labour the BNBCC 
tried to attract Chinese immigrants by granting them a piece of agricultural land and making 
cash advances. In Sarawak land was increasingly made available to Chinese Malaysians from 
the 1950s onwards. The main Chinese beneficiaries of government policy in Sarawak were 
those engaged in the pepper industry. Prior to the Pacific War the planting of pepper was 
subsidized, in the period thereafter pepper shoots were distributed and between 1957 and 
1970 exporters received large loans.  In Malaya Chinese tin miners could benefit from the 
establishment of a buffer stock during the early 1920s and again from 1956 onwards. After 
independence, the strong political connections of Chinese Malaysian businessmen ensured 
them access to fresh tin deposits and large timber concessions. Crony capitalism, then, finds 
its origin in the early independence period. 
From the outset policies for the promotion of Indian Malaysian entrepreneurship were 
largely non-existent. There were cooperatives catering for Indian plantation labourers, but it is 
doubtable whether these enabled members to make inroads in the commercial sector. After 
independence the MIC took matters into its own hands when it established the NLFCS. This 
cooperative proved successful, but lacked the financial capabilities of state-owned enterprises 
established to promote Malay business interests. It should be noted that aforementioned 
paddy, pepper and rubber schemes, in principle applied to all entrepreneurs not withstanding 
ethnic origin. In practice, however, these schemes came to support Indians less than other 
ethnic groups either because they played a minor role in a given industry, as in the case of the 
rubber industry, or no role at all. 
 Despite the absence of supporting policies, Indian Malaysians had a significant stake 
of the financial sector up until independence. They similarly ranked above Malay and non-
Malay indigenes in commerce and dairying. As for the Chinese, these remained the dominant 
ethnic group in forestry, mining and the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy 
throughout the period under review. After independence, government policies caused Malay 
entrepreneurs to gain market share from their Chinese counterparts in construction and 
transport, but Chinese Malaysians did prove better capable to benefit from new opportunities 
in forestry and manufacturing. In the case of Chettiar moneylenders it was not so much direct 
competition from Malays that led their competitive position to deteriorate, but rather the fact 
that Malays could now obtain credit from government.  
In general, expenditure on rural development did not improve the competitive position 
of Malay Malaysian entrepreneurs vis-à-vis entrepreneurs from other ethnic groups.  Anno 
1920 Malays already controlled a significant portion of paddy production and rubber 
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smallholdings; rubber and paddy schemes only came to consolidate this. Moreover, paddy 
schemes were largely unsuccessful in raising planters’ income. There were two exceptions to 
this rule. First, under the First Malaysia Plan new plantings and replantings on estates were no 
longer subsidized, thus enabling the smallholding sector to gain a larger market share than the 
estate sector. Second, FELDA schemes allowed Malay Malaysian smallholders to enter the 
palm oil industry. 
 Different from the NEP era, affirmative action did not lead to a significant 
strengthening of Malay entrepreneurs’ competitive position in estate agriculture, 
manufacturing, mining and services; by 1970 still less than two percent of equity capital in 
Malaya was under Malay Malaysian ownership. In these industries, the importance of the 
initial competitive position of an ethnic group and business connections was clearly still 
dominant over government policies. 
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